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NOTES
BEYOND LAWRENCE v. TEXAS:
CRAFTING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
SEXUAL PRIVACY
Kristin Fasullo*
After the watershed 2003 US. Supreme Court decision Lawrence v.
Texas, courts are faced with the daunting task of navigating the bounds of
sexual privacy in light of Lawrence's sweeping language and
unconventional structure. This Note focuses on the specific issue of state
governments regulating sexual device distribution. Evaluating the
substantive due process rights of sexual device retailers and users, this
Note ultimately argues that the privacy interest identified in Lawrence is
sufficiently broad to protect intimate decisions to engage in adult
consensual sexual behavior, including the liberty to sell, purchase, and use
a sexual device.
INTRODUCTION
For over four years, high-end retailer Myla lay nestled among luxury
retailers Cartier, Chloe, Dolce & Gabanna, Donna Karan, Gucci, and Prada
on the comer of New York's 69th Street and Madison Avenue, catering to a
chic clientele seeking to indulge in luxury and elegance.' With boutiques in
London's posh Selfridges and Harrods department stores, celebrity clients,
wares showcased on hit television shows, and innovative products featured
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 2007, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Robert Kaczorowski, for
his invaluable guidance throughout the Note-writing process, James M. Shea for his
dedication, advice, and enthusiasm, and my family for their unending support and
encouragement.
1. Myla London, About Myla, http://www.mylausa.com/infoPages/about.php (last
visited Apr. 5, 2009); Rima Suki, Myla Opens in New York's Upper East Side, N.Y. MAO.,
Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/shopping/columns/shoptalk/9965/; see
also Ruth La Ferla, Good Vibrations, Upscale Division, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2004, at ST 15;
Uppereast.com, Madison Between 69th & 70th, http://www.uppereast.com/madbe
t6970.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (enumerating the retailers directly north of Myla);
Uppereast.com, Madison Between 68th & 69th, http://www.uppereast.com/madbet6869.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (listing the stores directly south of Myla). Myla's New York
flagship closed its doors in early 2009 after four years in business; it is currently seeking a
new location. See Myla USA, Store Locator, http://www.mylausa.com/infoPages/locator.php
(last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
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at design expos around the world, it is no surprise that Myla is the best-
selling brand per square foot of its type.2 Its glass and marble fagade,
world-class design team, and luxury goods made from the finest silks, laces,
Swarovski crystals, and pearls fit seamlessly with Madison Avenue's
sophisticated image.3 However, unlike any other store on Madison Avenue,
Myla is part of an increasing number of boutiques offering high-end
lingerie, sleepwear, and sexual devices at couture prices.4 The store's
upscale image and high sales volume does little to suggest the complicated
state of sexual devices in America.5
During the twentieth century, eight states enacted legislation designed to
prohibit the sale and distribution of sexual devices.6 Over the past twenty-
five years, seven of those statutes were challenged in the courts, yielding
inconsistent results. 7
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for an
individual right to privacy; however case law has acknowledged "specific
guarantees" of a zone of privacy in the Bill of Rights under the penumbras
2. See StyleFrizz, Lydia Hearst for Myla Lingerie, http://stylefrizz.com/200808/lydia-
hearst-for-myla-lingerie/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
3. See id. See generally La Ferla, supra note 1.
4. See Myla London, http://www.mylausa.com/index.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2009);
see also infra Part l.A.2.b. See generally La Ferla, supra note 1.
5. Myla is a privately held company and does not make its sales data public. It does,
however, represent that it is the best-selling lingerie brand per square foot. See supra note 2
and accompanying text.
6. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2005) (prohibiting the distribution, possession with
intent to distribute, and agreement to distribute sexual devices); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
18-7-101(6), -102 (West 2008) (prohibiting the wholesale promotion-manufacture,
issuance, sale, provision, mailing, delivery, transfer, transmission, publishing, distribution,
circulation, dissemination-and possession with intent to wholesale promote sexual
devices); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (2007) (prohibiting the dissemination of any material
the possessor knows to be obscene); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2007) (prohibiting the
manufacture, issue, sale, provision, transmission, distribution, mailing, circulation,
dissemination, or advertising of any sexual device); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2008)
(prohibiting the manufacture, issue, sale, provision, transmission, distribution, mailing,
circulation, dissemination, or advertising of any sexual device); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-
105 (West 1999) (forbidding the sale, advertisement, publication, or exhibition of any device
meant to stimulate the genitals); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21-43.23 (Vernon 2003),
invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (prohibiting
the sale, giving, lending, advertisement, and distribution of obscene devices); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-373-18.2-374 (2004) (making it illegal to prepare, manufacture, produce, sell,
lend, transport, or distribute any obscene item); see infra Part I.B.
7. See generally Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 738 (striking down Texas's anti-
vibrator statute); Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007)
(upholding Alabama's obscenity statute in its entirety); This That & The Other Gift &
Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga., 285 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
advertising ban imposed by Georgia state law violated the First Amendment and vacating
and remanding to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia); People ex rel.
Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985) (invalidating
Colorado's anti-vibrator statute); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990) (striking down
Kansas's anti-vibrator statute); State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000) (invalidating
Louisiana's anti-vibrator statute); PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2004)
(declining to overturn Mississippi's anti-vibrator statute); see also infra Part II.
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of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 8 The U.S.
Supreme Court has found the right to privacy to be fundamental, and hence,
subject to heightened scrutiny, although the Court has not definitively
prescribed the bounds of this zone of privacy. 9 Over the past four decades,
the judiciary has struggled to determine what is entitled to privacy
protection; no area of debate has been so central to overarching privacy
doctrine as the right to sexual privacy.' 0
Attempting to resolve the issue of sexual privacy, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have addressed whether statutes
prohibiting the sale of sexual devices are constitutionally enforceable. I I
The courts are divided as to whether sexual privacy is a fundamental right,
what standard should apply, and whether public morality may be the sole
justification for a statute.
Following Lawrence v. Texas,12 the pivotal 2003 U.S. Supreme Court
case that invalidated state sodomy laws, 13 litigation challenging the
constitutionality of statutes proscribing the sale of sexual devices has
hinged on two disparate interpretations of the liberty interest announced in
Lawrence. As part of a series of decisions, referred to collectively as
Williams v. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit declined to read
Lawrence as newly recognizing a fundamental right. 14 In Williams, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued to enjoin the enforcement of
Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act on behalf of user and vendor
plaintiffs, and argued that the statute violated a fundamental right to sexual
intimacy because it impermissibly burdened one's ability to use sexual
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see Maggie Ilene Kaminer,
Note, How Broad Is the Fundamental Right to Privacy and Personal Autonomy?-On What
Grounds Should the Ban on the Sale of Sexually Stimulating Devices Be Considered
Unconstitutional?, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 395, 399-401 (2001). See generally
Shelly Elimelekh, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Circuit Court Opinions Limiting the
American Right to Sexual Privacy, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 261, 270 (2006).
9. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 270; see also Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 563 (1986) (noting the ill-defined bounds of privacy
doctrine); Timothy 0. Lenz, "Rights Talk" About Privacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L. REV.
1613, 1613-14 (1997) (exploring the debate over a constitutional right to privacy and the
judges' role in prescribing the boundaries of those rights).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see also Apasu-Gbotsu, supra note 9, at 563; E. Lauren
Amault, Comment, Status, Conduct, and Forced Disclosure: What Does Bowers v.
Hardwick Really Say?, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 757, 759 (2003).
11. See infra notes 258-72, 277-86, 311-22 and accompanying text.
12. 539 U.S. 558.
13. Id. at 558.
14. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 2007) (finding that,
even after Lawrence, public morality remains a sufficient rational state interest); Williams v.
Attorney Gen. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Lawrence Court "declined the invitation" to recognize a fundamental right to sexual
privacy).
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devices.' 5 The state countered that the statute was within the state's use of
police power to restrict the sale of sex. 16 Although the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama thrice sided with plaintiffs, 17 the
Eleventh Circuit "decline[d] the ACLU's invitation" "to add a new right to
the current catalogue of fundamental rights under the Constitution: a right
to sexual privacy."' 8  Looking to the U.S. Supreme Court's missed
opportunities to declare a fundamental right to sexual privacy in the past,
the Williams court maintained that the Lawrence Court's failure to engage
in traditional fundamental rights analysis was a tacit admission that no
fundamental right to sexual privacy exists.19 Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished the private sexual conduct at issue in Lawrence from
the commercial statute at issue in Williams, concluding that Lawrence only
rejects morality as a legitimate government interest where the law in
question targets private and noncommercial conduct.20
The second interpretation of Lawrence offers a broader interpretation. In
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,21 the Fifth Circuit, tracking the
language in Lawrence, identified a right to be free from governmental
intrusion in one's most intimate relations, including the decision of whether
to bring sexual devices into the bedroom.22  Further, the Reliable
Consultants court concluded that after Lawrence, morality alone is an
insufficient state interest to uphold a challenged statute.23
This Note posits that taken together, First and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence identifies a fundamental right to sexual privacy that limits the
state's ability to regulate the sale of sexual devices. Part I presents the
social history of sexuality in America and examines the limits and
protections courts and legislatures have placed on personal privacy and
obscenity. Part II then focuses on the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit split
regarding whether statutes banning the sale of sexual devices may be
invalidated by invoking a fundamental right to sexual privacy. Finally, Part
III resolves the division among the courts by addressing the issue of sexual
15. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2005) (prohibiting the distribution, possession with
intent to distribute, and agreement to distribute sexual devices); Williams IV, 378 F.3d at
1233-34; see also Paul F. Theiss, Case Note, Constitutional Law-The Eleventh Circuit
Fumbles the Supreme Court's Recognition of a Due Process Right to Sexual Intimacy, 58
SMU L. REv. 481, 481-82 (2005). The user plaintiffs included women who used sexual
devices therapeutically, and the vendor plaintiffs included both store owners and individuals
who sold sexual devices at home parties. Williams v. Pryor (Williams II1), 220 F. Supp. 2d
1257, 1265-67 (N.D. Ala. 2002); see also Theiss, supra, at 482.
16. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1233.
17. See Williams v. King (Williams P), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231-32 (N.D. Ala.
2006); Williams III, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1257; Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d
1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
18. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1233; see also Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1316; Williams v.
Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 949-50 (11 th Cir. 2001).
19. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235-37.
20. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
21. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
22. Id. at 746-47.
23. Id. at 745-46.
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device sale, distribution, promotion, and usage under the Due Process
doctrine after Lawrence v. Texas. The resolution assesses the fate of anti-
sexual device legislation through the lens of the disparate interpretations set
forth in Part II. This Note ultimately advocates for a broad right to sexual
privacy free from government intrusion under Lawrence v. Texas.
1. EXPLORING THE TRADITIONAL BOUNDS OF AMERICAN SEXUAL PRIVACY
AND AUTONOMY
Part I traces the development of sexual autonomy in America. It
examines the history of American sexual norms from the colonial era to the
present and considers the place of sexual devices in that history. Part I then
discusses the prevalence of sexual device use by examining statistics and
assessing the devices' cultural visibility. Part I then sets forth the statutory
schemes under which sexual devices have been regulated by the states. It
concludes by discussing traditional Fourteenth Amendment privacy analysis
and First Amendment obscenity doctrine.
A. The History of Sexual Autonomy in America
1. A Brief History of American Sexual Norms
Seventeenth-century 6migrrs from Europe to the British Colonies in
North America brought with them beliefs about sexuality born out of the
Protestant Reformation. 24 Unlike Catholicism, which condemned all carnal
desires as consequences of the Biblical fall from grace, Protestantism
distinguished between appropriate forms of sexual expression in marriage
(that which led to reproduction) and transgressive behavior (acts outside of
marriage or for nonreproductive purposes). 25 The early modern Protestant
notion that marital love and affection were acceptable justifications for
sexual behavior changed the meaning of sexuality in Anglo-American
marriages. 26 Sex became a duty husband and wife owed one another, and
could be seen as a way to enhance the marital relationship. 27 Although both
men and women were expected to experience pleasure during intercourse,
the sexual union remained closely tied to reproduction.28 Women were
expected, and often desired, to bear children throughout their reproductive
24. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 4 (2d ed. 1997). The discussion of early American intimacy in Part
I.A of this Note focuses mainly on the sexual norms of Anglo-American Protestants.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 4-5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. Deeply rooted Western medical and folk traditions held that female orgasm was
necessary for both physical health and conception. Id.
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years, and it is unlikely that many couples outside the wealthy used
contraceptives to limit family size.29
Throughout the seventeenth century, the clergy and the courts were the
most influential moral authorities in colonial America. 30 The best-known
colonial sources of morality were the fundamentalist New England
Puritans.3' Leaders, such as Thomas Shephard and Cotton Mather,
admonished their congregations to avoid sexual stimulation and suppress
desires; they emphasized marriage as the only suitable outlet for sexual
expression, and condemned masturbation and premarital sex.32 However,
contemporary moderate Puritans, Catholics, and Quakers, while still
adhering to an ideal model of marital, reproductive sex, permitted a greater
acceptance of desire and put a lesser emphasis on sexual restraint.33
While the church and courts continued to be the dominant moral
authorities in eighteenth-century America, circulation of medical advice
literature increased in the colonies.34  Although it is impossible to
determine the exact readership of these tracts, it is well documented that
several gynecological and marital advice books became highly popular in
America and seemingly reinforced commonly held beliefs about
sexuality.35  Perhaps the most widely read, Aristotle's Masterpiece,
maintained that reproduction was the primary goal of sexuality while
repeating the early modem belief that sexual pleasure for both male and
female was both desirable and compulsory for conception. 36
For colonial youths, courtship provided an opportunity in which they
could begin to explore their sexual desires. 37 Although parental opinion
was much considered in the selection of a suitor, parents did not arrange
marriage in the colonies and young people formally courted without a
chaperone and often in public view;38 however, it was not uncommon for
courting couples to escape from the public view to engage in immodest
29. Id. at 5-6. Those couples who did wish to limit family size would do so by delaying
marriage, refraining from sex while nursing, and possibly by engaging in coitus interruptus.
Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 18-19.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 19.
34. See id.; see, e.g., ARISTOTLE'S MASTERPIECE (28th ed. 1766); JOHN ARMSTRONG, THE
ART OF PRESERVING HEALTH (1796); JOHN ARMSTRONG, THE OECONOMY OF LOVE: A
POETICAL ESSAY (1768); see also STEVEN NISSENBAUM, SEX, DIET, AND DEBILITY IN
JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SYLVESTER GRAHAM AND HEALTH REFORM ch. 2 (1980); Otho T.
Beall, Jr., Aristotle's Master Piece, in America: A Landmark in the Folklore of Medicine, 20
WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 207, 207-10 (1963).
35. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 19.
36. ARISTOTLE'S MASTERPIECE, supra note 34, at 32-34 (discussing traditional ideas
about conception); see D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 19-20. Colonial society
put so great an emphasis on marital sex channeled toward reproduction that in New England,
a bride could leave a marriage if her husband was impotent. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra
note 24, at 23.
37. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 21.
38. Id.
3002 [Vol. 77
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY
behavior.39 As the eighteenth century progressed, young couples selected
their mates with less regard to property and family relations, and it became
increasingly common for young people to announce a premarital pregnancy
as a way of exerting control over who they married.40
During this time period, greater geographic mobility resulting from the
growth of industry, social disruptions caused by war, and the spread of
enlightenment ideas resulted in a breakdown of familial and community
supervision of sexual behavior.41 This loosening of moral control increased
the sexual vulnerability of women, especially those of the lower classes,
who were at risk of harassment on the streets and faced fewer guarantees
that premarital intercourse would lead to marriage. 42 Consequently, a
greater emphasis was placed on a woman's ability to maintain her sexual
virtue, and moralists urged women to resist temptation and remain chaste. 43
Patriots urged Americans to be moderate in their passions, including
engaging in sexual behavior, to avoid the decadence they believed
weakened European governments; this gave rise to the symbol of woman as
the passionate irrational. 44 At the close of the preindustrial era, sexuality
was not a private matter, but rather one regulated by family and the
community; it was not until the early twentieth century that notions of
individual privacy became a central sexual value.45
In the nineteenth century, the middle-class ideal of the chaste, pure
female was juxtaposed with increasing scientific knowledge, medical
advice publications discussing sexual health, and greater opportunities for
39. Id. at 22. "As long as a couple's sexual relations were channeled toward marriage,
colonial society could forgive them." Id. Several seventeenth-century moralists noted that
couples often absconded to barns and fields during harvest to commit acts filled "'with folly
and lewdness."' Id. at 21.
40. See id. at 43. Premarital pregnancy rates spiked in the late eighteenth century,
leading historians to cite a "'revolt of the young' against familial controls over marriage and
sexuality." Id. (quoting Joan Hoff-Wilson, The Illusion of Change: Women and the
American Revolution, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 404 (Alfred Young ed., 1976)). In parts of New England, as many
as one-third of all brides were pregnant on their wedding day. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 44; see also CHRISTINE STANDSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN
NEW YORK, 1789-1860, at 24, 27 (1986); Nancy F. Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation
of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN 162, 170 (Nancy F.
Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979); JOAN JENSEN, LOOSENING THE BONDS: MID-ATLANTIC
FARM WOMEN, 1750-1850, at 117-18 (1986); Robert V. Wells, Illegitimacy and Bridal
Pregnancy in Colonial America, in BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 349, 354-55
(Peter Laslett, Karla Oosterveen & Richard M. Smith eds., 1980). Despite relatively
egalitarian sexual regulation among men and women in the early colonial period, the social,
economic, and political changes of the late eighteenth century saw attitudes about sexuality
diverge along gender lines; this change would continue for over a century. D'EMILIO &
FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 52.
43. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 44. "In the late eighteenth century,
female chastity did not yet presume an absence of sexual desire. Virtue could be attained
through self-control; it was not necessarily innate or biologically determined." Id. at 45.
44. See id. at 45; see also Cott, supra note 42, at 165-68.
45. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 52.
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sexual exploration outside the family.46  Between the 1830s and 1870s,
information regarding contraceptive devices circulated widely, 47 and gave
couples successful means to take control of their sexual and reproductive
lives. 48 Medical advice literature stressed the importance of restraint in
one's sexual life.49 Much of the medical literature directed at young men
stressed the dangers of masturbation, however most medical writers did not
discount sexual pleasure completely. 50 Although popular consciousness
held women to be innately pure, abundant literature urging women to
abstain from masturbation contradicted that notion. 51  Collectively, the
medical literature of the nineteenth century did not seek to suppress sexual
desires, rather it "shift[ed] sexual control from traditional external
community pressures to individual will, or self-control. '' 52 Medical experts
maintained that when properly channeled, sexual contact encouraged
intimacy, good health, and spirituality.5 3
Although urban middle-class families valued sexual privacy, sexuality
was increasingly commoditized in working-class neighborhoods and in the
46. See id. at 59-73.
47. See, e.g., EDWARD BLISS FOOTE, MEDICAL COMMON SENSE (1858); FREDERICK
HOLLICK, THE MARRIAGE GUIDE (1859); ROBERT DALE OWEN, MORAL PHYSIOLOGY (1831);
Charles Knowlton, Fruits of Philosophy: An Essay on the Population Question (1832),
reprinted in S. CHANDRASEKHAR, A DIRTY, FILTHY BOOK 87 (1981).
48. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 58. During the course of the
nineteenth century, the marital fertility rate dropped significantly, from an average of slightly
over seven children in 1800, to under six children by 1825, to an average of only 5.42
children in 1850, and to 4.24 by 1880. Id. Concerned about the rapidly declining birth rate
and bolstered by the reforming spirit of the emerging middle class, Congress passed the
Comstock Act in 1873, which outlawed the circulation of obscene materials, including
contraceptive information, through the mails. See Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598
(1873); D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 60; see also Shirley J. Burton, The
Criminally Obscene Women of Chicago, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SEXUALITY 264,265 (Kathy Peiss ed., 2002).
49. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 68-73.
50. See id. at 68-69. While male masturbation was frowned upon during the colonial
period because it was nonprocreative, the theory that masturbation caused insanity and
disease became popular in America in the nineteenth century. Id.; see also G. J. BARKER-
BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNowN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN
AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 179 (2000); PRIMERS FOR PURITY:
SEXUAL ADVICE TO VICTORIAN AMERICA 34-46 (Ronald G. Walters ed., 1974); BENJAMIN
RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DISEASES OF THE MIND (1812);
REV. JOHN TODD, THE STUDENT'S MANUAL (1882).
51. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 71. Parents were advised to prevent their
daughters' dangerous habits, such as touching their genitals and reading romance novels,
because if left to their own devices, females' desires could be easily aroused. Id. at 72; see
DR. MILLER, LECTURES TO LADIES ONLY AT WAVERLEY HALL, SATURDAY, MAR. 19, AT 1-2
P.M. ON THE CONSTITUTION AND DISEASES OF WOMEN, THEIR CAUSES, MEANS OF
PREVENTION AND CURE (1870).
52. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 72. Ironically, these publications may
have introduced many readers to the practices, such as masturbation and too frequent
intercourse, that the pamphlets discouraged. Id.
53. See id. In the late nineteenth century, the notion of a romantic marriage in which
sexual intimacy strengthened the union was an ideal of the urban middle class. Id. at 78. A
successful marriage for a working couple struggling to make a living was grounded more in
economic stability than romantic love. Id.
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West. 54 In areas where single men congregated for work, such as mining
towns, cities, and docks, an underground culture of drinking, dance halls,
brothels, and assignation houses was sure to follow. 55 The sale of sex was
not limited to its most literal incarnation; by the 1840s, pornographic
literature became available in American markets. 56  Demand for
pornographic literature and photographs expanded during the Civil War and
remained high in the latter years of the nineteenth century.5 7 The new
market for sexual commerce was not met without controversy. In the
decades following the Civil War, politician and public moralist Anthony
Comstock unilaterally took up "the task of combating sex in print, art, [and
personal] correspondence. '58 After a year of lobbying the state and federal
legislatures to tighten anti-obscenity laws, the U.S. Congress passed "An
Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of Obscene Literature
and Articles of Immoral Use," (the Comstock Act) in 1873 without
debate. 59 Although the Comstock Act did not effectively restrict paths of
sexual knowledge, it did successfully reinforce the notion that American
sexuality should be relegated to the private sphere.60 Comstock waged his
anti-obscenity campaign until his death on the eve of World War I; his
death, coupled with public outrage surrounding his campaign against
Margaret Sanger, seemed to mark a new chapter in American sexuality.61
54. Id. at 130.
55. See id. The ease of acquiring sexual services was not merely a working-class
phenomenon; both middle- and upper-class men kept or visited prostitutes. Id. at 131.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 131-32.
58. Id. at 159. Founder of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, former
U.S. postal inspector, and politician, Anthony Comstock's crusade for a federal obscenity
statute is often considered to be one man's quest to regulate personal vice. However,
regardless of its origins, the Comstock Act represented a fundamental shift in moral
regulation from the family and church to civil law. Burton, supra note 48, at 265.
59. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 159. Comstock himself enforced the law
as a U.S. postal inspector, and seized and destroyed twelve hundred pounds of materials
ranging from penny postcards to fine arts, and from pulp fiction to Tolstoy. Id. at 160; see
supra note 48.
60. See Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note
24, at 160. Despite the law's efforts, the Comstock Act did not effectively deter family
planning. Americans still had access to contraceptive and sexual health advice from medical
journals, physicians and pharmacists, and euphemistic advertisements in newspapers and
magazines. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 60-61. Although the legal definition
of obscenity has changed over time, the sentiments of the Comstock Act remain in force as
modem federal anti-obscenity statutes.
61. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 223; see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, BIRTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET SANGER 72-73 (1970); JAMES REED, THE
BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC
VIRTUE 97 (1978). Margaret Sanger advocated for an open discussion of contraception,
breaking from the nineteenth-century idea of voluntary motherhood through abstinence.
D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 223; see also Women Write Margaret Sanger for
Birth Control Advice, 1924, 1930, 1935, 1936, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN SEXUALITY 316,316-18 (Kathy Peiss ed., 2002).
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2. The History of Sexual Devices in America
Part I.A.2 traces the history of sexual device use in America from the
clinical treatment of hysteria to a contemporary device used by women and
couples to prevent disease, treat sexual dysfunction, and achieve pleasure.
Part I.A.2.a and I.A.2.b discuss the statistical prevalence and societal
visibility of sexual devices and assess their role in modem sexuality.
The vibrator emerged as a medical instrument at the end of the nineteenth
century as a means for physicians to achieve more rapid and efficient
massage treatments for female patients suffering from hysteria.62 Hysteria,
literally "'that which proceeds from the uterus,' ' 63 was a condition
recognized in Western medicine from the fourth century B.C. until 1952,
when the American Psychiatric Association dropped the term from official
diagnostic usage.64  From early on, the classic symptoms of hysteria-
chronic anxiety, irritability, sleeplessness, erotic fantasies, nervousness,
muscle spasms, shortness of breath, sensations of heaviness in the abdomen,
lower pelvic edema, loss of appetite, and vaginal lubrication-were
determined to result from sexual deprivation. 65 The virtual disappearance
of hysteria as a diagnosis after the middle of the twentieth century "suggests
it is perceptions of the pathological character of these women's behavior
that have altered, not the behavior itself."'66
Because it was known that hysterical symptoms were associated with
sexual deprivation, single women suffering from hysteria were urged to
marry and have intercourse with their husbands. 67 Afflicted women who
were single, widowed, nuns, or unhappily married were prescribed genital
massage and exercise as the most effective means of temporarily relieving
62. See RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: "HYSTERIA," THE VIBRATOR,
AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 3 (1999); see also Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology
Full Circle: A History of Anti-vibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 326, 327 (2006).
63. MAINES, supra note 62, at 21.
64. See id. at 2; see also ALAN KROHN, HYSTERIA: THE ELUSIVE NEUROSIS (1978);
PHILLIP R. SLAVNEY, PERSPECTIVES ON "HYSTERIA" (1990); ILZA VEITH, HYSTERIA: THE
HISTORY OF A DISEASE (1965); GEORGE R. WESLEY, A HISTORY OF HYSTERIA (1979).
65. MAINES, supra note 62, at 8, 23, 24; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 327. The
term "hysteria," although primarily used to describe cases of sexual deprivation, was a broad
term used to describe a variety of unexplained female ailments. MAINES, supra note 62, at 8.
Sigmund Freud described hysterical women as entering into paralytic states, a symptom
rarely mentioned before the nineteenth century, and contemporary physicians described
nonepileptic loss of consciousness as a symptom of hysteria. MAINES, supra note 62, at 8.
See generally Edward Shorter, Paralysis: The Rise and Fall of a "Hysterical" Symptom, 19
J. SOC. HIST. 549 (1986). What modem physicians would diagnose as anorexia nervosa was
considered a hysterical disorder into the nineteenth century. MAINES, supra note 62, at 8; see
also JOAN JACOBS BRUMBERG, FASTING GIRLS: THE HISTORY OF ANOREXIA NERVOSA 67-70,
107, 115-20, 143 (1988).
66. MA1NES, supra note 62, at 8; see also Roberta Satow, Where Has All the Hysteria
Gone?, 66 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 463, 463-73 (1979).
67. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 9, 27.
3006 [Vol. 77
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY
the symptoms of hysteria. 68 Physicians or midwives would massage the
female patient's vulva for as long as three hours in an effort to induce the
"hysterical paroxysm" that would provide temporary relief.69 Physicians
before the twentieth century misunderstood the function of the clitoris in
arousal and orgasm, and therefore believed these hysterical paroxysms were
distinct from the female climax; it was believed that only vaginal
intercourse with an erect penis could bring a healthy female to orgasm, and
hence the treatment of hysteria through genital massage was met with little
controversy.70
Because the symptoms of hysteria were chronic and seldom resolved,71
treating hysterical women was a lucrative market for physicians who
constantly sought novel ways to decrease the time necessary to induce the
hysterical paroxysm in order to maximize the number of patients who could
be treated. 72 From antiquity through the nineteenth century, hydrotherapy
at bathing spas was recognized as a way to soothe the symptoms of
hysterical disorders.73 By the mid-nineteenth century, the age-old water
cure was mechanized as the douche, a high-pressure shower used to
stimulate the pelvic region.74 Steam technology was soon adapted to the
medical massage market, but like hydrotherapy douches, the size and
68. See id. at 8-9, 25. Suggested exercises included horseback riding, or movement of
the pelvis in a swing, carriage, or rocking chair. Id. at 8, 32; see also BERNARD MANDEVILLE,
A TREATISE OF THE HYPOCHONDRIACK AND HYSTERICK DISEASES (Scholars' Facsimiles &
Reprints, Inc. 1976) (1730).
69. MAINES, supra note 62, at 9; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 327.
70. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 9-10; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 328.
Because the genital massage employed in the treatment of hysteria did not involve
penetration, physicians saw nothing controversial or unethical about massaging a patient's
vulva and clitoris manually or with mechanical devices. MAINES, supra note 62, at 10. In
fact, the introduction of the speculum for pelvic examinations was met with far more
skepticism than massage techniques to induce the hysterical paroxysm. Id.
71. Masturbation was not recommended as a treatment for hysteria until the early
twentieth century. MAINES, supra note 62, at 9; see also H. W. LONG, SANE SEX LIFE AND
SANE SEX LIVING: SOME THINGS THAT ALL SANE PEOPLE OUGHT TO KNOW ABOUT SEX
NATURE AND SEX FUNCTIONING 125-27 (1919); Robert L. Dickinson & Henry H. Pierson,
The Average Sex Life ofAmerican Women, 85 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1113, 1113-17 (1925).
72. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 4. There is evidence that before the development of
electromechanical or hydriatic devices, physicians sought to pass off genital massage to any
other source-husbands, midwives, miscellaneous other devices. Id.
73. See id. at 72-73; see also Jacqueline S. Wilkie, Submerged Sensuality: Technology
and Perceptions of Bathing, 19 J. Soc. HIST. 649 (1986).
74. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 13; see also SIMON BARUCH, THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF HYDROTHERAPY: A GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF WATER IN DISEASE 259 (3d
ed. 1908) (citing W. B. Oliver, The Blood and Circulation, LANCET, Jun. 27, 1896).
Hydrotherapeutic equipment was often prohibitively expensive and permanently fixed.
MAINES, supra note 62, at 13; see also Herbert Ant & Walter S. McClellan, The Physical
Equipment for Administration of Health Resort Treatment, 123 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 695, 695-
99 (1943). Sites housing hydriatic massagers became destinations, like spas, requiring
transportation, lodging, meals, etc., and were hence only available to the affluent. MAINES,
supra note 62, at 13-14.
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expense of these devices limited their use to spas and physicians' offices
with large physical therapy practices. 75
Developed in England in the late 1880s, the electromechanical vibrator
resolved many of the shortcomings of earlier water and steam powered
massage devices. 76 It was less expensive and more portable and reliable
than its predecessors, and for the first time, allowed patients to treat
themselves for hysteria at home. 77 Within fifteen years of the introduction
of the first electromechanical vibrator, designed by British physician Joseph
Mortimer Granville and manufactured by Weiss, a reputable British
manufacturer of medical instruments, 78 over a dozen battery-powered and
plug-in vibrators were advertised to consumers in periodicals such as Good
Housekeeping and Hearst's Magazine, and in the Sears, Roebuck and
Company Electrical Goods catalog.79 During the first two decades of the
twentieth century, the vibrator was marketed to consumers at all price
points as a home electrical appliance, not unlike a toaster or sewing
machine. 80 During the early twentieth century, the perceived function of
the vibrator was so distinct from female sexual gratification that the most
widely advertised brand, White Cross Electric Vibrators, drew its name
from "an Episcopalian sexual purity organization that flourished in Britain
in the late 1880s." 81  However, the therapeutic camouflage of vibrators
became difficult to maintain in the 1920s when they began appearing in
erotic films. 82 This, compounded with a greater understanding of female
sexual function, made it difficult for physicians and patients to disguise the
vibrator as a mere therapeutic device, and resulted in the vibrator fading
from advertising and the public (though not private) consciousness from
1928 until the 1960s when they reemerged as overtly sexual devices. 83
Although no state has explicitly prohibited the personal use of sexual
devices, the latter half of the twentieth century saw several states attempt to
75. MAINES, supra note 62, at 14-15.
76. See id. at 11.
77. See id. at 11, 100.
78. Id. at 93-94. See generally JOSEPH MORTIMER GRANVILLE, NERVE-VIBRATION AND
EXCITATION AS AGENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS AND ORGANIC
DISEASE 57 (London, J. & A. Churchill 1883).
79. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 102-04.
80. Id. at 19, 102-07. The devices were marketed primarily to females as a relaxation
device in periodicals such as Needlecraft, Home Needlework Journal, Modern Woman,
Hearst's, McClure 's, Woman's Home Companion, and Modern Priscilla. Id.; see supra note
79 and accompanying text. They were also marketed toward men to give as gifts to restore
health and vitality to their wives. MNES, supra note 62, at 19.
81. MAINES, supra note 62, at 107; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 328.
82. MAINES, supra note 62, at 10, 108; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 329.
83. See MAINES, supra note 62, at 108-09; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 329.
Although it is likely that vibrators were available in the years between 1928 and the 1960s,
they were not advertised in reputable publications. MAINES, supra note 62, at 109. In the
intervening years, advertisements for the "massager," not "vibrator," did appear in some
low-market magazines and were promoted under names such as "Spot Reducers," "Glorifier
Massagers," or "Massage Pillows." Id. at 108.
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put possession and distribution restrictions on vibrators.8 4 A number of
states have passed legislation effectively banning the distribution and sale
of all sexual devices under obscenity statutes. Such "anti-vibrator" laws
have been tested in seven states: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 85 Because all legislation regulating
sexual device distribution in this country has been part of anti-obscenity
statutes, the challenger bears the burden of proving that the devices have
specific nonprurient value, therefore turning to traditional therapeutic
arguments. 86  Late-twentieth- and twenty-first-century physicians have
testified to the utility of vibrators in treating anorgasmic women who "'may
be particularly susceptible to pelvic inflammatory diseases, psychological
problems, and difficulty in marital relationships.' ' 8 7 Medical experts have
also lauded sexual devices as safe alternatives in an era of HIV/AIDS and
high incidence of sexually transmitted infections. 88
The success of contemporary medical and epidemiological arguments
before the courts has concerned some scholars who maintain that, "[b]y
putting forth primarily medical arguments, the supporters of these statutes
make the tacit concession that the statutes are partially valid, and that a
female's personal choice to masturbate with a toy does not exist as a right
in and of itself."'8 9 Unlike other sexual acts, the choice to use an insertable
sexual device "does not necessarily affect anyone other than the user
herself," and hence, "vibrator bans are wholly bound up in the deprivation
of individual liberties." 90 Feminist scholars have noted that many sexual
aids designed primarily for men, such as Playboy and Viagra, do not fall
within the anti-obscenity statutes that regulate the sale of sexual devices,
84. See supra note 6; see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 330.
85. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking down
Texas's anti-vibrator statute); Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir.
2007) (upholding Alabama's obscenity statute in its entirety); People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven
Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985) (invalidating Colorado's anti-
vibrator statute); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990) (striking down Kansas's anti-
vibrator statute); State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000) (invalidating Louisiana's anti-
vibrator statute); PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2004) (declining to overturn
Mississippi's anti-vibrator statute); see also Lindemann, supra note 62, at 330-36; infra Part
II. Virginia's statute banning the distribution of sexual devices has not yet been tested. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-373-18.2-374 (2004) (making it illegal to prepare, manufacture, produce,
sell, lend, transport, or distribute any obscene item).
86. Lindemann, supra note 62, at 343; see infra Part I.D.
87. Lindemann, supra note 62, at 337 (quoting Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1025 (citing the
expert testimony of Dr. Douglas Mould)).
88. See LINDA SINGER, EROTIC WELFARE: SEXUAL THEORY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
EPIDEMIC (Judith Butler & Maureen MacGrogan eds., 1993); Lindemann, supra note 62, at
342; see also Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742 (noting plaintiffs' argument that
sexual devices are beneficial for couples unable to engage in intercourse because of
contagious disease).
89. Lindemann, supra note 62, at 342.
90. Id. at 343.
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such as vibrators and dildos, primarily used by women and same-sex
couples. 91
a. Statistical Prevalence of Sexual Device Use
Part I.A.2.a discusses the statistical prevalence of sexual device use. Part
I.A.2.b discusses the accessibility and popularity of sexual devices at retail
outlets ranging from internet stores to boudoir-style boutiques to one's own
living room; it further details depictions of sexual devices in the media,
specifically on television.
Statistics regarding the prevalence of sexual device use have long been
speculative because of the sensitivity of the topic as well as the unreliable
methodology used in many surveys about sex in America.92  Many
contemporary reports of American sexuality still cite data collected by Dr.
Alfred Kinsey in the late 1930s through the early 1950s; his methodology
has since been questioned, and regardless, the America he surveyed is
vastly different than that of today.93
Born out of the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, the National Health and Social
Life Survey (NHSLS) adapted socioscientific survey methodology in an
attempt to capture the sexual practices of a representative sample of the
American population in the early 1990s.94 Because of the study's goal of
identifying the prevalence of certain sexual behavior that may contribute to
the spread of disease, female self-stimulation was not discussed at length.95
The study does note that approximately two percent of women purchased
sexual devices in the year preceding the survey and that approximately forty
percent of women had self-stimulated in the previous year.96
91. Id. at 344; see also Tristan Taormino, Dallas Dildo Defiance, VILLAGE VOICE, May
21, 2002, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/people/0221 ,taormino,34944,24.html.
92. See ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA 15 (1994). Many surveys of sexual
behavior in the middle decades of the twentieth century were self-selecting reports of a
particular magazine's readership, and at best catalogued the sexual practices of the target
audience, and at worst represented the behavior of an atypical few. See id. at 22-25.
93. Id. at 15. For more information regarding Alfred Kinsey's landmark studies on
American sexuality, see ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE (1953); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
94. See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 92, at 25-26. For a comprehensive discussion of the
study's methodology see id. at 25-41.
95. See id. at 155-68.
96. Id. at 157-58. The study does not discuss the number of women who have used
sexual devices in the past, only those who have recently purchased such aids. Id. at 157; see
also D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 175. The estimate that forty percent of
American women have masturbated is not new to the late twentieth century; Katharine
Bement Davis's study of Victorian women, Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred
Women, was an early attempt to quantify the sexual behavior of American women, and
contained chapters examining the use of contraceptives, "auto-erotic practices," sexual
desire, and homosexuality. See generally KATHARINE BEMENT DAVIS, FACTORS IN THE SEX
LIFE OF TWENTY-TWO HUNDRED WOMEN (1929). The study, focusing on a sample of
middle-class women, found that approximately sixty-five percent of unmarried college-
educated women and forty percent of married women acknowledged masturbating at some
point in their lives. Id. at 97-98, 152-53.
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The Berman Center's 2004 study, The Health Benefits of Sexual Aids &
Devices: A Comprehensive Study of their Relationship to Satisfaction and
Quality of Life, was one of the first nationwide studies focusing exclusively
on the prevalence of sexual device use among females. 97 The study was
conducted from March 16, 2004, to April 5, 2004, via postal mail with a
random national sample of 2594 women between eighteen and sixty years
of age.98 Overall, the study finds that forty-four percent of women have
used a sexual device.99 Findings indicate that one in five women self-
stimulates at least once per week (17.5 million American women), and of
those who self-stimulate, fifty-nine percent use a sexual device to do so.100
Despite a popular misconception, women who are in relationships, and
not single women, are most likely to use a sexual aid. 10 1 Of the study
participants, seventy-eight percent of women who use or have used a sexual
device did so while in a relationship. 10 2 Of the women who were most
likely to use a self-stimulation device, forty-three percent were living with
their partners, but not married; and thirty-five percent were in a
relationship, but not living together. 103 Nine out of ten women report being
comfortable discussing their sexual device use with their partner, and most
women view sexual aid use as a complement to their sexual relationship
and not a substitute. 0 4
97. BERMAN CTR., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SEXUAL AIDS & DEVICES: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO SATISFACTION AND QUALITY OF LIFE 15
(2004). The Berman Center is a specialized health care center for women, focused on
women's and couples' sexual health. The center, founded and run by Dr. Laura Berman, is
dedicated to helping women enrich their lives in a safe, therapeutic environment. Berman
Center, The Clinic, http://www.bermancenter.com/home/clinic (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
Dr. Berman is a sex educator and therapist based out of Chicago; she is a frequent guest on
The Oprah Winfrey Show, and has been featured on CNN, Good Morning America, The
Today Show, and in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, Cosmopolitan, Glamour,
Marie Claire, Elle, Fitness, Men's Health, Women's Health, Jane, Self, More, and Redbook
magazines. Berman Center, About Dr. Laura Berman, http://www.bermancenter.com
/home/clinic/staff (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
98. BERMAN CTR., supra note 97, at 15. For a comprehensive discussion of the survey's
methodology see id. at 4-5.
99. Id. at 8. The proportions of women who have ever used a sexual device are as
follows: forty-three percent of women between eighteen and twenty-four; fifty-one percent
of women twenty-five through thirty-four; forty-six percent of women thirty-five through
forty-four; forty-one percent of women forty-five through fifty-four; and thirty-two percent
of women between fifty-five and sixty years of age. Id. at 6. The percentage of respondents
testifying to sexual device use in the socioscientific Berman Center survey is similar to the
percentage of respondents indicating sexual device use in self-selection reports. In the 2005
Durex Sex Survey, a self-selecting survey conducted on the website of condom manufacturer
Durex, forty-five percent of Americans claimed to have used sexual devices during sex.
DuREx, 2005 GLOBAL SEX SURVEY 15 (2005).
100. BERMAN CTR., supra note 97, at 7.
101. Id. at 6.
102. New Study on Female Sexuality Reveals Increased Use of Sexual Aids by Women,
PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 13, 2004, http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT = 109&
STORY=/www/story/09-13-2004/0002249382&EDATE=.
103. BERMAN CTR., supra note 97, at 6.
104. Id. at 10. Popular women's magazines, such as Cosmopolitan, offer advice on how
to integrate vibrator use into partner sex. How Do I Bring Up Using a Sex Toy with My
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The Berman Center's study found that, overall, women accept vibrator
use as a complement to a healthy sex life and believe that sexual device use
is nothing to be ashamed of.10 5 It also found that women who have used
vibrators do not consider them a substitute for sexual relations with a
partner. 10 6 The study concludes that women who use a vibrator have an
easier time reaching orgasm, have less pain during intercourse, have
increased sexual desire, and report a higher level of arousal; these factors
contribute to a higher level of sexual satisfaction and greater overall
satisfaction in one's life. 107
b. From the Backroom to the Luxury Boutique: The Increasing Visibility
and Availability of Sexual Devices
Over the course of the past two decades, sexual aids have transitioned
from devices sold in the basements and backrooms of adult bookstores to
middle-class friendly items sold at luxury boudoir shops, national retailers,
at Passion Parties, and over the Internet. "Adult Novelty" sales grew
exponentially between the 1990s and 2 000s to what is now a $1.5 billion-
dollar industry. 108
Since 1977, trailblazing San Francisco retailer Good Vibrations has
offered women "a safe, comfortable alternative to sleazy porn shops" in
which they can indulge their curiosities in an atmosphere seeking to foster
an open dialogue about sexuality.' 0 9 In an effort to bring sexual device
retailers into the mainstream and reduce the stigma associated with
traditional adult novelty stores, Good Vibrations redesigned its sales floor
with colorful banners, distinctive shopping bags, and "Pottery Barn-style"
themed displays-surely fit for the retailer's main customer base: 35- to 45-
year-old straight, middle-class women in relationships. 110
Good Vibrations's innovative business model and high-volume catalogue
sales inspired retail outlets in other urban centers to open similar female-
friendly, well-curated boutiques. After interning with the Bay Area retailer,
Claire Cavanah opened the popular store Toys in Babeland in Seattle,
Man?, Cosmopolitan Online, http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/advice/questions/sex-
toy-with-man?click=mainsr (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
105. BERMAN CTR., supra note 97, at 15.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15-16.
108. Lessley Anderson, A Sex Toy Story, CNN MONEY, June 1, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2-archive/2006/05/01/8375938/index.ht
m; see also THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION
78 (2004). Doc Johnson Enterprises, the world's largest supplier of sexual devices, saw
extraordinary growth in the 1990s, with wholesale sales growing from $8 million in 1990 to
$45 million in 2000, and with sales reportedly doubling between 1999 and 2001 (retail sales
of over $100 million). See LAQUEUR, supra, at 78.
109. See Anderson, supra note 108. For a description of the evolution of Good
Vibrations and the philosophy of its founder, see Rona Marech, PROFILE: Joani Blank A
Sexual Aide: Founder of Revolutionary Store Good Vibrations Brought Sex Toys to the
Masses, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2003, at El.
110. See Anderson, supra note 108; see also Marech, supra note 109.
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which has since expanded to New York's chic SoHo, bohemian Lower East
Side, and family-friendly Park Slope neighborhoods. 111 The Park Slope
location, opening to much fanfare in June 2008, marketed itself as "kid-
friendly" and features colorful displays, "upbeat music, well-dressed sales
women and infant changing tables"-a respectable place for individuals and
couples to shop without the sleazy imagery of the sex industry.11 2 Evoking
the decadent sophistication of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Parisian
Salons, luxury New York and Los Angeles retailer Kiki de Montparnasse
sells high-end "instruments of pleasure" ranging in price from $125 to
$1500.113 Just as Victoria's Secret brought fashionable lingerie from two
extremes--department stores and the adult industry-into the shopping
mall, these concept stores have successfully distanced the sale of sexual
aids from seedy sex shops and have reduced the stigma and awkwardness
associated with shopping for them. 114
Specialty boutiques are not the only retailers ushering sexual devices into
mainstream availability: well-respected national retailers ranging from
Amazon.com to Wal-Mart have also entered the sexual aid market with
varied degrees of frankness. National superstores Target1 15 and Wal-
1 11. See Babeland, Babeland Store Locations, http://www.babeland.com/about/locations
(last visited Apr. 6, 2009); see also Sharon Pian Chan, 2000 Small Business Profiles: Toys
in Babeland, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at Small Business 18-19.
112. Elizabeth Downey, Family-Friendly Sex Store Opens in New York City, Fox
NEWS.COM, June 16, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,367201,00.html; N.Y.
Magazine Daily Intel Blog, http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/03/park-slope-
parents are_aflutte.html (Mar. 3, 2008, 14:30 EST). For a discussion of the social
acceptability of sexual devices, see generally Posting of Jennifer 8. Lee to N.Y. Times City
Room Blog, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/taking-election-freebies-without-
guilt/?scp=2-b&sq=babeland&st-nyt (Nov. 4, 2008, 18:07 EST).
113. See Kiki de Montparnasse, http://www.kikidm.comlshop/home.php (last visited Apr.
6, 2009); see also Charlotte Druckman, Toy Time, N.Y. MAG., July 19, 2006, at 56. The
boutique is also a veritable art gallery, selling "libidinous" art from renowned photographers
Helmut Newton, Irving Penn, and Cindy Sherman. Time Out New York, Shopping: Kiki de
Montparnasse, http://www.timeout.com/newyork/venues/soho/607/kiki-de-montparnasse
(last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
114. See Shaun Frentner, Victoria's Secret, in 5 ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR
CULTURE 43, 43-44 (2000). See generally Nancy V. Workman, From Victorian to Victoria's
Secret: The Foundations of Modern Erotic Wear, 30 J. POPULAR CULTURE 61, 61-73
(1996).
115. See, e.g., Target.com, Harmonic Massage Wand, http://www.target.com/Harmonic-
Massage-Wand/dp/BOO1 C48GG8/qid=1225070275/ref=-br_1_2/176-36438480897446?ie=U
TF8&node=64426401 1&frombrowse=l &pricerange=&index--tgt-mf-mv&field-browse=644
26401 l&rank='pmrank&rh=&page=2 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); Target.com, Human Touch
Acuvibe Personal Massager, http://www.target.com/Human-Touch-Acuvibe-Personal-
Massager/dp/BOO1OYYU70/ref-sc ri_2?ie=UTF8&pfrd r=1 24T5MXXZ9G7QQS8K6BX
&pflrdp=451839801 &pfirdi=BOOOWGWC26&pf rds=bottom- 10&pLrd_m-A LVC38T
7YXB528&pfrd-t=-201 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009); Target.com, Human Touch Personal
Massager, http://www.target.com/Human-Touch-Personal-Massager-AV-680/dp/BOOOWG
WC26/ref-sc -ri 2/176-3643848-0897446 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). It is notable that the
"[g]uests who bought this item also bought" bar offers a link to K-Y Yours + Mine Couples
Lubricant-a tacit admission that these devices are not mere "massagers."
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Mart 1 6 sell phallic-like "personal massagers" that resemble vibrators
marketed for sexual use. Online megaretailers Amazon.com 17 and
Drugstore.com 118 offer extensive sexual wellness stores selling a range of
items including "Condoms, Personal Lubricants, Vibrators, Dildos, Erotic
Massage, and More." 119 The availability of sexual devices at such retail
outlets with broad and diverse client bases may indicate growing acceptance
of their sale and use.
The current trend of Passion Parties has brought the discourse about
sexual devices literally into one's living room. Popular in the southern and
midwestern United States, Passion Parties are similar to Tupperware
Parties-a "Passion Consultant" demonstrates how to use the company's
"premier sensual products" to the partygoers, who then have the
opportunity to order any products they like. 120 The stated mission of
Passion Parties, Inc. is "[t]o share the Passion Parties opportunity so that
any woman can experience the prosperity of owning her own business; to
share the products that will enhance any woman's relationship; and to share
the philosophy of women helping women." 121 As a result of positioning
itself as a pro-family, pro-intimacy company, Passion Parties, Inc. has done
a "brisk business" in the Bible Belt. 122 Linda Brewer, a Passion Consultant
featured in a 2004 New York Times Magazine piece, lauded the parties as
wonderful ways for women to learn about their bodies and open the lines of
communication about sex with their partners. 123
Despite a bevy of pleased partygoers and ten years of continuous sales
growth, Passion Parties, Inc. and similar ventures have encountered some
resistance. In November 2003, Passion Parties representative Joanne Webb
was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor under Texas's obscenity law
116. See, e.g., Walmart.com, Healthometer Gentle Touch Personal Massager,
http://wAaw.walmart.com/catalog/product.do?productid=6486432 (last visited Apr. 6,
2009); Walmart.com, HealthoMeter Mini Bird Personal Massager, http://www.walmart.com/
catalog/product.do?productid=6486431 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009); Walmart.com,
Healthometer Mini Personal Massager, http://www.walmart.com/catalog/product.do
?productid=6487501 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (offering an item that is virtually identical
to a device recommended on the Berman Center's website, DrLauraBerman.com, Sex Toy
Finder, http://www.drlauraberman.com/public/toyfinder/product4.aspx (last visited Apr. 6,
2009)). These items are online exclusives; none are sold in Wal-Mart stores.
117. Amazon.com, Sexual Wellness: Health & Personal Care,
http://www.amazon.com/Sexual-Wellness-Products/b/ref-sc-bm br_3760901_1_67?ie=UT
F8&node=3777371&no=3760901&me=ATVPDKIKXODER (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
118. Drugstore.com, Fun & Sexy Adult Toys, Vibrators, Lubricants & More,
http://www.drugstore.com/templates/browse/default.asp?catid=21298&trx=GFI-0-ROTABS
&trxpl=21298&trxp4=60 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
119. Amazon.com, supra note 117.
120. Passion Parties®: The Ultimate Girls' Night In®, http://www.passionparties.com/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2009); see also Pamela Sitt, The Party that Could Get You Arrested in
Texas: In-Home Sex-Toy Sales Make for Naughty-But Increasingly Mainstream-Fun,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at E 1.
121. Passion Parties, supra note 120.
122. Jennifer Senior, Everything a Happily Married Bible Belt Woman Always Wanted to
Know About Sex But Was Afraid to Ask, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 4, 2004, at 32.
123. See id.
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when she sold two vibrators to undercover police officers posing as a young
married couple. 124 After suffering from a brain tumor that left her sexually
dysfunctional, Linette Servais became a sales consultant for Pure Romance,
a company similar to Passion Parties, Inc. that sells sexual devices at home
parties, to help other women with similar problems.' 25 Active in her church
choir for over thirty-five years, Servais's parish priest dismissed her of her
choral director duties once he discovered that she was a "'consultant for a
firm which sells products of a sexual nature that are not consistent with
Church teachings."1 26
Although Pure Romance's product line may have been unacceptable for
the pastor of St. Joseph's Catholic Church in New Franken, Wisconsin,
sexual aids are not necessarily inconsistent with Christian teachings. 127
Online Christian retailer Book22.com sells "intimacy products for married
couples" founded on the belief that "God intended that such love, as spoken
of in Song of Solomon, be a beautiful and normal part of marital life." 128
Book22.com seeks to restore the beauty of intimacy among married couples
through the sale of items ranging from massage oils and lubricants to "aids"
(including vibrators and stimulation sleeves). 129
The discussion of sexual device use and its relationship to women's
sexual health has carried over into public discourse. The Oprah Winfrey
Show has hosted several episodes over the years stressing the role of sexual
devices in female sexual fulfillment, 130 and she has even featured an article
124. See Laurie Fox, Was Hers a Crime of Passion? Saleswoman Finds Law an
Obscenity, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2003, at IB; Glenna Whitley, Sex Toy Story,
DALLAS OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2004, available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/2004-04-
08/news/sex-toy-story/; Texas Mom Faces Trial for Selling Sex Toys, CNN.cOM, Feb. 11,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/1 1 /obscenity.trial.reut/; see also Jota Borgmann,
Hunting Expeditions: Perverting Substantive Due Process and Undermining Sexual Privacy
in the Pursuit of Moral Trophy Game, 15 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 179 (2006); Elimelekh,
supra note 8, at 261; Senior, supra note 122. The charges against Joanne Webb were
eventually dropped. Texas Woman No Longer Faces Charge in the Sale of Sex Toys, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2004, at N27.
125. Choir Director Canned for Focus on Wrong Organ: Catholic Priest Removes
Musician from Church Who Sold Sex Toys on the Side, MSNBC.cOM, May 31, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 18947154/.
126. See id. (quoting Reverend Dean Dombroski's letter to his congregation regarding
Servais's dismissal).
127. See id.
128. Book22, Intimacy Products for Married Couples, http://book22.com/merchant2/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2009); see also The Joy of Christian Sex Toys, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Mar. 21,
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyld = 18975616.
129. Book22, Aids, http://www.book22.com/merchant2/merchant.mvc?Screen=CTGY&
StoreCode=Book22&CategoryCode=A (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
130. See, e.g., The Oprah Winfrey Show: Behind Closed Doors: Sex Therapy (Harpo
Productions broadcast Nov. 3, 2008). Dr. Laura Berman's appearance on the November 3,
2008, Oprah Winfrey Show, was so popular that Oprah.com created an online forum where
women could ask Dr. Berman questions about their sexuality, including questions about
sexual device use. Oprah.com, Dr. Laura Berman Answers Your Sex Questions,
http://www.oprah.com/article/oprahshow/20081002_tows-sexquestions/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2009). During the November 3, 2008, program, a couple engaged in therapy with Dr.
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in her magazine, 0, The Oprah Magazine, entitled "Everything You
Wanted to Know About Sex Toys," describing one woman's experience
shopping at luxury Manhattan store, Eve's Garden, with the advice of a sex
therapist. 131 And like any trend in popular culture, female friendly pleasure
boutiques and devices have not escaped satire. On the infamous Sex & the
City Season 1 episode, "The Turtle and the Hare," corporate lawyer,
Miranda, introduces ingenue gallerista, Charlotte, to "the Rabbit," a trendy
sexual device, which becomes popular among the series' protagonists. 132
Evidenced from broader, more mainstream distribution channels and a more
fluid discourse on television, sexual devices have gradually become an
increasingly visible component of private sexual pleasure.
B. A Moral Minority: Statutes Restricting the Distribution of Sexual
Devices
To date, eight states have enacted anti-obscenity statutes banning the
distribution of sexual devices-Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. 133 Seven of these states'
statutes have been tested by the courts and the outcomes have not been
consistent.134 Courts in Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, and Texas
have rejected (at least parts of) anti-vibrator legislation as unconstitutional,
while courts in Alabama and Mississippi have upheld such statutes;
Virginia's statute remains untested. 135 Part I.B of this Note examines the
text and relevant case law necessary to construct the interpretive framework
of each statute.
The Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act went into effect in 1998
as a criminal statute to combat "offense[s] against public health and
morals."' 36 The statute makes it unlawful for any individual to
knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to
distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing
of pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may be obscene
under this section if the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or
the possession with the intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of
erotica solely for the sake of prurient appeal. Any person who violates
Berman described the efficacy of a vibrator in inducing orgasms in women with low sex-
drives. The Oprah Winfrey Show: Behind Closed Doors: Sex Therapy, supra.
131. Lisa Kogan, Everything You Wanted to Know About Sex Toys, 0, OPRAH MAG., June
2006, available at http://www.oprah.com/ article/omagazine/omag_200606_kogan/.
132. Sex and the City: The Turtle and the Hare (HBO television broadcast Aug. 2, 1998).
133. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
134. See infra Part II. Because of inconsistent enforcement, it is unclear whether a
significant body of municipal ordinances prohibiting the sale of sexual devices exists. The
only noted challenge to a municipal ordinance is City of Portland v. Jacobsky, which held
that proper procedures were followed in enacting the law and that the statute was not
impermissibly overbroad or vague as to violate the Maine Constitution. 496 A.2d 646 (Me.
1985).
135. See infra Part II.
136. ALA. CODE § 13A-12 (2005).
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this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000) and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or sentenced to
hard labor for the county for not more than one year. 137
The 1998 Act was an amendment to Alabama's existing obscenity statute,
which did not originally criminalize the distribution of sexual devices. 138
From 1981 to 1985, when People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East
Colfax, Inc.139 invalidated portions of the statute referring to sexual
devices, 140 Colorado prohibited any individual from wholesale promoting
or possessing with intent to wholesale promote any sexual device. 14 1
Wholesale promotion included the manufacture, issuance, sale, provision,
mailing, delivery, transfer, transmission, publishing, distribution,
circulation, dissemination, or "offer or agree[ment] to do the same." 142
Georgia's anti-vibrator statute patently defines any device "designed or
marketed as useful for" the stimulation of human genitalia as obscene, and
categorizes as an aggravated misdemeanor any act in which an individual
sells, lends, rents, leases, gives, advertises, publishes, exhibits, or
otherwise disseminates to any person any obscene material of any
description, knowing the obscene nature thereof, or offers to do so, or
possesses such material with the intent to do so, provided that the word
"knowing," as used in this Code section, shall be deemed to be either
actual or constructive knowledge of the obscene contents of the subject
matter; and a person has constructive knowledge of the obscene contents
if he has knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable and prudent
person on notice as to the suspect nature of the material. 143
The Eleventh Circuit found the Georgia statute to violate a sexual device
retailer's First Amendment rights; however, the statute still remains on the
books. 144
Similarly, the Kansas and Louisiana obscenity statutes prohibit the
manufacture, issue, sale, provision, transmission, distribution, mailing,
circulation, dissemination, or advertising of any sexual device. 145 Both
states' laws have been challenged successfully; however, both statutes
remain viable law. 146
137. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1).
138. Id. § 13A-12-200.2; see Lindemann, supra note 62, at 331.
139. 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
140. Id.; see also Kaminer, supra note 8, at 417-18; Nicole Schilder, Note, Anti-vibrator
Legislation: The Law Is on Shaky Ground, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 89, 103-04 (2001);
infra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
141. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-102 (West 2008) (amended 1986).
142. Id. § 18-7-101.
143. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(a) (2007).
144. Id.; This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga., 285 F.3d
1319, 1323-25 (1 th Cir. 2002).
145. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2007); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2008).
146. See infra notes 324-46 and accompanying text; see also Kaminer, supra note 8, at
416-19; Schilder, supra note 140, at 104-05.
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. Under Mississippi law, effective July 1, 1983, an individual may be
prosecuted for "distributing unlawful sexual devices when he knowingly
sells, advertises, publishes or exhibits to any person any three-dimensional
device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of
human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such devices with the
intent to do so." 147 A similar offense, wholesale distribution of unlawful
sexual devices, makes illegal the distribution with intent to resell any sexual
aid.14 8
The Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas's 1979 obscenity statute was
unconstitutional in the 2008 decision Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle.149
The predecessor of Texas's current obscenity statute was enacted in 1973
with the goal of prohibiting "obscene material."' 50 Six years later, in 1979,
the Texas legislature redefined "obscene material" consistent with the
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity detailed in the 1973 decision
Miller v. California.151 That same year, the legislature expanded the scope
of the statute to prohibit the promotion and wholesale promotion of
"obscene device[s]," which included selling, giving, lending, distributing,
or advertising. 152 The legislature chose to broadly define "obscene device,"
as any device "designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation
of the human genital organs"; this definition disregards the Miller test. 153
In 1985, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statute did not
violate an individual's right to privacy, concluding that there was no
constitutional right to "'stimulate . . . another's genitals with an object
designed or marketed as useful primarily for that purpose." ' 154
Amendments that were enacted in 1983 added a narrow affirmative defense
to protect individuals who provided sexual devices for "a bona fide
medical, psychiatric, judicial, legislative, or law enforcement purpose."'155
Violation was punishable by a state jail sentence of up to two years. 156
147. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (West 1999).
148. Id.
149. See infra notes 277-86, 311-22 and accompanying text.
150. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973)).
151. 413 U.S. 15. Under the Miller test in considering whether a material is obscene, and
hence not entitled to constitutional protection, a trier of fact must consider
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
152. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23 (Vernon 2003), invalidated by Reliable Consultants,
Inc., 517 F.3d 738.
153. Id. § 43.21; see also Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 740-41; supra note 151
and accompanying text.
154. Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
155. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23, invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d
at 741 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23(g) (amended 1983)).
156. Id. § 43.239(a), (d); see Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 741.
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C. Within the "Privacy" of One's Own Bedroom? Tracing the
Constitutional Protection of Sexual Privacy
Although the text of the Constitution does not explicitly set forth an
individual right to privacy, case law has acknowledged "specific
guarantees" of a zone of privacy in the Bill of Rights under the penumbras
of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 157 While the
U.S. Supreme Court has not definitively prescribed the bounds of this zone
of privacy as it relates to sexual devices, the Court has examined an
individual right of privacy with regard to reproduction, 158 homosexual
sodomy, 159 and pomography.' 60 Taken together, the cases discussed below
define a privacy interest broad enough to protect an individual's private,
consensual sexual behavior from unwarranted government intrusion.1 61
Part I.C discusses the breadth and limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process privacy analysis.
The Constitution's silence on the right to privacy has necessitated a
jurisprudential framework through which the Court may frame questions of
fundamental liberties. The Supreme Court has protected individual liberties
from unwarranted government interference through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 62 The standard of scrutiny applied to a
legislative act challenged upon due process grounds depends on whether
that statute implicates a fundamental right. 163 If a fundamental right is
involved, the Court analyzes whether the state action in question is justified
by a compelling government interest, and whether that statute is narrowly
tailored to achieve its goals with the least interference possible. 164 Statutes
evaluated under strict scrutiny seldom survive judicial review. 165 If a
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see Kaminer, supra note 8, at
399-401. See generally Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 270.
158. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
159. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
160. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see also Elimelekh, supra note 8,
at 270; infra Part I.D.
161. See infra Part I.D.
162. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720-21 (1997) (enumerating the liberties
guaranteed by the due process clause and clearly articulating the Court's established
substantive due process analysis, commonly referred to as the "Glucksberg Two-Step");
Angela Holt, Comment, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v. Pryor and the
Constitutionality ofAlabama's Anti-vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 937 (2002); see also
Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 270; Kaminer, supra note 8, at 399. See infra notes 168-95 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of the Due Process Clause to protect
individual liberties).
163. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Holt, supra note 162, at 937; Kaminer, supra note
8, at 400.
164. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Holt, supra note 162, at 937.
165. See Kaminer, supra note 8, at 400; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that strict scrutiny is reserved for state
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fundamental right is not burdened by the challenged state action, the Court
applies rational basis review. Under this lower level of scrutiny, a statute
does not violate due process if it is rationally related to advancing a
legitimate state interest. 166 A statute analyzed under rational basis scrutiny
is rarely invalidated. 167
In Griswold v. Connecticut,168 the Supreme Court recognized a right to
privacy in the marital bedroom. The Appellants in Griswold, Estelle T.
Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut, and C. Lee Buxton, a physician and professor at Yale Medical
School, were found guilty of being accessories to contraceptive use, and
were fined $100 each. 169 The Griswold Court recognized that neither the
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights directly address matters of marital
intimacy; however, considering First Amendment case law, the Court
acknowledged that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."' 170 Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the
majority, invalidated the Connecticut statute, reasoning that the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments guarantee a zone of privacy under the
Bill of Rights that is broad enough to encompass the marital relationship.171
In his concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan II disagreed with the
majority's zone of privacy rationale, instead reasoning that "the proper
constitutional inquiry ... is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment
violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""q 72 The
scope of the privacy interest identified in Griswold is narrow-it is
restricted to the intimate choices made within traditional heterosexual
marriage. 173 However, the decision served as a catalyst for the evolution of
sexual privacy jurisprudence over the next four decades.
Seven years later, Eisenstadt v. Baird174 "clarifie[d] the nexus between
the right to privacy and personal autonomy."' 175 Appellee William Baird
classifications affecting fundamental rights); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992) (referring to the strict scrutiny analysis in Roe v. Wade).
166. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993); see, e.g., Williams v.
King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231-32 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
167. Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 240 F.3d 944, 948 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
rational basis test is "a highly deferential standard that proscribes only the very outer limits
of a legislature's power"); Williams V, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32 ("Statutes tested under
this standard are deemed constitutional if 'there is any reasonable conceivable state offacts
that could provide a rational basis for the statute' (quoting Beach Commc 'ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
314)).
168. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
169. Id. at 480.
170. Id. at 484; see also Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 270-71; Kaminer, supra note 8, at
401.
171. Griswold, 381 U.S. at484.
172. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
173. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 272.
174. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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was convicted under Massachusetts law and sentenced to five years'
imprisonment for lecturing to a group of Boston University students about
contraceptive methods and for giving an unmarried student a package of
vaginal foam. 176 The Massachusetts law provided that only a registered
pharmacist or physician may administer or prescribe contraceptive drugs or
devices, and access to such drugs or devices were exclusively available to
married persons. 177 Under this statutory scheme, three distinct classes were
delineated: (a) married couples who may obtain contraceptives for the
purpose of preventing pregnancy only from a doctor's or pharmacist's
prescription; (b) an unmarried individual who may not obtain
contraceptives for the prevention of pregnancy; and (c) couples or singles
who may obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent the spread of
disease. 178 The Court applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and held that there was no "ground of difference that rationally
explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons"
under the Massachusetts law.' 79 Writing for the majority, Justice William
J. Brennan maintained that, although the privacy interest discussed in
Griswold "inhered" to the marital relationship, "the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals."180  According to the majority, the right to privacy,
therefore, must belong to all individuals, married or single, to "be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion" into fundamental matters.'l8 Hence,
even a narrow reading of Eisenstadt finds implicit in Justice Brennan's
equal protection analysis the recognition of a right to privacy for all people,
married or unmarried, from state restriction of access to contraception.18 2
Dicta in Carey v. Population Services International1 8 3 made clear that the
Court had not yet recognized that the right to privacy encompasses a liberty
interest in sexual autonomy.t 84 In Carey, the Supreme Court held that state
175. Kaminer, supra note 8, at 403 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 449).
176. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440-41.
177. Id. at 441. The relevant part of the Massachusetts statute at issue in Eisenstadt v.
Baird reads,
A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs
or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [A] registered
pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs
or articles to any married person presenting a prescription from a registered
physician.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21A (West 1966).
178. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 442.
179. Id. at 447.
180. Id. at 453.
181. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.")); see also Kaminer, supra note 8, at 403.
182. See Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right of Privacy: Sex and
the Constitution, 54 DEPAuL L. REv. 909, 928 (2005).
183. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
184. Id. at 685-86, 694 n.17 ("[T]he Court has not definitively answered the difficult
question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating
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legislation limiting access to contraceptives was subject to the same strict
scrutiny analysis as those statutes prohibiting access. 185  The majority
maintained that, by restricting distribution channels to a small number of
retail outlets, contraceptives were "considerably less accessible to the
public, reduce[d] the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase, and
lessen[ed] the possibility of price competition."' 186 The Court held that such
restrictions clearly burden one's fundamental right to decide whether to
beget a child free from undue governmental interference. 187 The decision
to bear or beget a child free from unqualified intrusion by the state
necessarily implicates some level of sexual privacy to engage in
nonreproductive sexual behavior; however, in Carey, the Court was not yet
prepared to articulate a right to sexual intimacy. 188
In the context of abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeast
Pennsylvania v. Casey189 reaffirmed an individual's right to privacy 190 and
bodily integrity, 191 and tacitly acknowledged that the liberty interest created
in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey is broad enough to encompass
nonreproductive sexual behavior. 192  Writing for the plurality, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor maintained that matters
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
[private consensual sexual] behavior among adults."); see also Hermann, supra note 182, at
928.
185. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
186. Id. at 689.
187. Id.
188. See Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 273; Hermann, supra note 182, at 929-30.
189. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
190. Id. at 849 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 678; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97
(1977) (holding that an ordinance strictly defining the family unit was an intrusion into the
family without a tangible state interest). See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (extending the right to contraception expounded in Griswold to unmarried
individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia's
miscegenation statute); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a right to
privacy in marital relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (recognizing the right to procreate as fundamental); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that there exists a fundamental right for parents to control the
education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that state
regulation of liberty must be reasonably related to a valid state end).
191. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990)
(holding that an inmate with a serious psychotic disorder may receive treatment against his
will if the medicine is in his best medical interest); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)
(holding that surgical intrusion into a person's body to extract evidence is unreasonable);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (applying due process to prohibit "conduct
that shocks the conscience")).
192. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (acknowledging that a woman may engage in sexual
activity without the intention of becoming pregnant); see also Hermann, supra note 182, at
934; Kaminer, supra note 8, at 406-07.
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matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State. 1
93
Recognizing that a state may have a legitimate interest in protecting
potential human life, Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, reaffirmed a woman's right to personal liberty, which
includes "a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's person."'
194
Justice Stevens reasoned that, just as our constitutional scheme rejects "'the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds,"' so too
does it reject government control of women's bodies.' 9 5
Despite the advances in privacy law with respect to contraception, the
Court's exploration of the boundaries of the privacy doctrine has not always
expanded individual liberties. In August 1982, Michael Hardwick was
charged with engaging in a sexual act with another male in violation of a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. 196 Justice Byron White, writing for
the majority, identified the issue of the case as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." 19 7  Justice White noted that the line of cases from Griswold
through Carey did not extend the privacy right to encompass any and all
adult private consensual sexual conduct.' 98  The majority further
maintained the long-standing history of antisodomy laws dispels any notion
that a right to engage in homosexual sodomy is "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed."" 199
In contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence, no case has
greater capacity to broadly recast the privacy doctrine than the conundrum
of Lawrence v. Texas. On the night of September 17, 1998, the Harris
County Police Department was notified of a weapons disturbance and
dispatched to the Houston apartment of John Geddes Lawrence. 20 0 Upon
entering the apartment, the police witnessed Lawrence and another man,
Tyrone Garner, engaged in anal sex in violation of the Texas Homosexual
193. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
194. Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
195. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)). Justice John Paul
Stevens stated that a woman's liberty interest includes those decisions of the most private
and personal nature. Id.
196. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (providing that one caught
engaged in a sexual act involving the sexual organ of one party and the mouth or anus of
another shall be punished by up to twenty years of imprisonment).
197. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
198. Id. at 191 ("[Any claim that these cases ... stand for the proposition that any kind
of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription is unsupportable").
199. Id. at 191-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325-26 (1937)). For antisodomy laws in existence at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified
in 1791, see id. at 192 n.5. For antisodomy laws in existence at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, see id. at 193 n.6.
200. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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Conduct Law. 20 1 The men were arrested, held in jail overnight, charged,
and eventually convicted by a justice of the peace. 20 2 On appeal, their
convictions were upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District relying on Bowers v. Hardwick.20 3
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Texas decisions on due process
grounds, and in doing so, overruled Bowers.204 Justice Anthony Kennedy
maintained that because Bowers had not induced detrimental reliance but
rather created uncertainty, stare decisis was merely instructive policy and
not an "inexorable command. ''20 5  The majority opinion went on to
explicitly adopt the conclusion of Justice Stevens in Bowers that "the fact
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. '20 6 This is perhaps
the most distinctive feature of Lawrence: the rejection of "bare moral
disapproval" as a legitimate state interest.20 7
After examining an extensive body of history on the subject, Justice
Kennedy concluded that, although there was a history of antisodomy laws
condemning the act as immoral for heterosexual and homosexual couples,
there was no long-standing history of legislation intending to target
specifically homosexual behavior. 20 8 Justice Kennedy noted that it was not
until the 1970s that any state singled out same-sex relations for criminal
prosecution. 209 Acknowledging that tradition is a starting point, but not
201. Id. at 562-63; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) ("A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the
same sex.")
202. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 577-78.
205. Id. at 577 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
206. Id. at 577-78.
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions, by married persons,
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to
produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices
by unmarried as well as married persons.
Id.
207. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1479, 1495 (2008) (citing
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78).
208. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-71; see, e.g., 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW §
1028 (T. H. Flood & Co. 1923) (1865); ROBERT DESTY, A COMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1882); JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 203 (Fred B.
Rothman& Co. 1985) (1881).
209. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (citing 1977 Ark. Gen. Acts 828; 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws
652; 1974 Ky. Acts 847; 1977 Mo. Laws 687; 1973 Mont. Laws 1339; 1977 Nev. Stat. 1632;
1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399). Only nine states passed
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always an ending point of substantive due process analysis, Kennedy
concluded that recent history has demonstrated an "emerging awareness
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 210
Although Justice Kennedy acknowledged the viability of deciding
Lawrence on equal protection grounds, he emphatically declined to do so,
instead viewing the issue at hand as whether a broader liberty interest in
sexual intimacy exists under the due process clause. 211 The Court declined
to decide whether the right asserted in Lawrence was fundamental, and
consequently the appropriate standard of review under the traditional
substantive due process framework remains indeterminate. 212 Instead, the
Court examined whether there was a rational basis for the existence of a
statute criminalizing same-sex intimacy, and concluded that "no legitimate
state interest supported a restriction on private sexual activity between two
consenting adults in private that did not cause physical or mental harm to
either of the participating parties." 213  Hence, the majority found that,
because no legitimate state interest existed, the Texas statute did not even
pass rational basis review, and therefore the issue of whether sexual
intimacy involved a fundamental right need not be resolved under a strict
scrutiny analysis. 214
Because of its opacity, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence has
sparked much debate and criticism among legal scholars and jurists across
the interpretive continuum. Courts and commentators who interpret
Lawrence broadly have lauded the case as reinventing privacy
jurisprudence-recasting pure privacy cases as liberty cases in which the
constitutionality of a statute can be "assessed by how well [it] respect[s] the
core of decisional autonomy due life-defining acts and choices." 215 Many
note that the spatial and temporal dimensions of Lawrence are broad,
"involv[ing] liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions." 216 Additionally, some who have interpreted
Lawrence broadly maintain that Lawrence forecloses the state's ability to
legislation criminalizing same-sex relations, and of those, five had repealed them since 1992.
Id.
210. Id. at 572.
211. Id. at 574-75; see also Barnett, supra note 207, at 1493; Hermann, supra note 182,
at 944.
212. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1379,
1413 (2008). It is noteworthy that Justice Anthony Kennedy began his opinion focusing on
the protection of liberty, rather than privacy. Barnett, supra note 207, at 1493-94. The focus
on liberty, rather than a fundamental right to privacy, deviates from the modem substantive
due process analysis provided by Glucksberg, and defies unanimous interpretation. Id.
213. Hermann, supra note 182, at 941 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-73).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, "Lawrence-ium ": The Densest Known Substance?, 11
WIDENER L. REv. 259, 266 (2005); Glazer, supra note 212, at 1415-16.
216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562; see, e.g., Glazer, supra note 212, at 1415-16 & n.238




legislate morality. 217 Perhaps a more refined, less broad, interpretation is
that morality alone is not a sufficient state interest.
In his dissenting opinion to Lawrence, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized
the Court's decision to overturn Bowers while remaining silent on whether
sexual autonomy was a fundamental right or considering what level of
scrutiny should apply. 218  An "emerging awareness," Justice Scalia
asserted, does not evince the kind of deeply rooted historical tradition the
Court will acknowledge as a fundamental right.21 9 After Lawrence, several
courts have interpreted the decision narrowly, declining to use the holding
in Lawrence to invalidate statutes banning same-sex adoption,220 reducing
sentences for statutory same-sex rape, 221 and banning the sale of sexual
devices.2 22 Other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have found Lawrence
broad enough to encompass liberty and autonomy of self.223 Part II of this
Note tracks the post-Lawrence decisions assessing the ability of Lawrence
to protect an individual's liberty interest to access and use sexual
devices. 224
Still, a third school of legal theorists maintains that the Lawrence Court's
self-conscious departure from the modem substantive due process analysis
"points the way to an alternative" means of resolving due process issues:
"protecting a 'presumption of liberty."'' 225 Proponents go on to state that
the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, along with the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "supports the conclusion
that the Constitution does protect a right to liberty, as the Court hints in
Lawrence."226 Hence, Lawrence lays the foundation upon which a doctrine
recognizing a general presumption of liberty may be built, permitting the
Supreme Court to disentangle itself from the Glucksberg two-step. 227
Though thematically distinct from the sexual privacy cases discussed
supra, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Glucksberg228
217. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 212, at 1416.
218. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare id. (stating that the
Lawrence majority "appl[ied] an unheard-of form of rational-basis review"), with Williams
v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1252-53 (N.D. Ala. 2006) ("The rational-basis
review applied in Lawrence is rare, but it is not 'unheard-of.' .. . [I]t is the form of review
contemplated in ... Carolene Products' footnote 4, to correct institutional imbalances when
... the democratic process does not operate as it should.").
219. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (1lth Cir.
2004); Glazer, supra note 212, at 1417.
221. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Glazer, supra note 212, at 1417-
18.
222. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11 th Cir. 2004). But
see Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Glazer, supra
note 212, at 1418.
223. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 740; see Glazer, supra note 212, at 1415-16.
224. See infra Part II.
225. Barnett, supra note 207, at 1495.
226. Id. at 1498.
227. See id.
228. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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clearly sets forth the Court's "established method" of conducting
contemporary substantive due process analysis.229 Washington State has
always legally prohibited assisted suicide.230 The statute, in its current
iteration, makes it a felony for one to "'promote a suicide attempt [by]
knowingly caus[ing] or aid[ing]another person to attempt suicide.' '"231 In
January 1994, three Washington physicians who would assist terminally ill
patients in committing suicide but for Washington's criminal prohibition,
along with three anonymous terminal patients, and the nonprofit
Compassion in Dying sought a declaration from Washington State and its
Attorney General that the statute was patently unconstitutional. 232 The
Western District of Washington found Washington's statute banning
assisted suicide to be "unconstitutional because it 'places an undue burden
on the exercise of [that] constitutionally protected liberty interest."' 233 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, disagreed, citing historical
precedent. 234 The respondents petitioned to have the case reheard en banc,
where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, relying on
Casey and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.235
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
found that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 236
In analyzing the validity of the Washington statute, the Court clearly
restated its "establish method of substantive-due-process analysis." 237 This
analysis would come to be known as the Glucksberg Two-Step:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
229. Id. at 720.
230. Id. at 706. Washington's first Territorial Legislature forbade "'assisting another in
the commission of self-murder' in 1854. Id. at 706-07.
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(l)-(2) (West 2009); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1)).
232. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707-08.
233. Id. at 708 (alteration in original) (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850
F. Supp. 1454, 1465 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on
Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ("[T]hat a
law which serves a valid purpose... has the incidental effect of making it more difficult...
to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the
State [interfere with] the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."), and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a state may
permissibly apply a clear and convincing evidence standard when assessing whether or not
to discontinue life-sustaining treatment). Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708. The district court also
found that the Washington statute was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id.
(citing Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466).
234. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (1995) ("In the two hundred
and five years of our existence no constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been
asserted and upheld by a court of final jurisdiction."); see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708-09
(summarizing the procedural history of Washington v. Glucksberg).
235. 497 U.S. 261; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709.
236. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
237. Id. at 720.
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"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Second, we have
required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking," that direct and restrain our exposition of the
Due Process Clause. . . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the
government to infringe... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."'238
Chief Justice Rehnquist's formula, though appropriated from earlier
decisions, is the test used by contemporary courts when approaching
questions of fundamental rights.239
D. Obscenity Doctrine as a Means of Defining Normative Boundaries of
Sexual Expression
All eight states that have enacted bans on sexual device distribution have
done so as part of those states' general anti-obscenity legislation.240 Part
I.D of this Note examines the relevant obscenity doctrine as it relates to
sexual expression.
In considering whether one may possess obscene films within the
confines of one's home, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Stanley v.
Georgia241 that the "mere private possession of obscene matter cannot
constitutionally be made a crime." 242 Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing
for the court, reaffirmed Justice Louis Brandeis's sentiment in Olmstead v.
United States243-that the right to be let alone is the most comprehensive
and most valued of all rights244-and acknowledged a "fundamental...
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy." 245  Although the Court
acknowledged Robert Eli Stanley's "right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home," 246 the outcome implied
that Stanley also had a right to satisfy his sexual needs within his home.247
238. Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
239. See Barnett, supra note 207, at 1488-89.
240. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; Part I.B.
241. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
242. Id. at 559.
243. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
244. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564; see supra note 181 and accompanying text.
245. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
246. See id. at 565.
247. See id. ("He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right to
satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.... Whatever
may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach
into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.").
3028 [Vol. 77
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY
The Court maintained that there may be justifications for obscenity statutes
provided they do not reach into the privacy of one's own home. 248In Miller v. California,249 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standards
by which obscenity is assessed. In considering the constitutionality of a
California statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit
materials, the Court answered the broader question-under what
circumstances may the states regulate material as obscene? The Court
"confine[d] the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict
or describe sexual conduct. '250 In determining whether material is obscene
under Miller, the trier of fact must consider: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards (not national
standards) would find that the work appealed to prurient interests; (b)
whether the work depicted or described sexual conduct, as defined by state
law, in a "patently offensive" manner; and (c) whether the work, in its
totality, lacked serious literary, artistic, scientific, or political value.251
Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the Court, maintained that "no one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core'
sexual conduct" as defined by state law.252
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,253 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute, regulating the alleged obscene
materials exhibited at an adult theatre. 254 The Court vacated and remanded
the lower court's decision, concluding that there was nothing in the
Constitution prohibiting states from regulating obscene materials-even
those viewed only by consenting adults-as long as the restrictive statute
comports with First Amendment standards. 255
In the wake of Lawrence, the relevance of obscenity law has been called
into question.256 The Lawrence Court's assertion that morality alone is not
a sufficient reason to uphold laws prohibiting a particular act calls into
question the basic premise of obscenity doctrine-"if sexual activity
248. Id.
249. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
250. Id. at 24.
251. Id. at 24-25.
252. Id. at 27. For clarification on what the Court deems "patently offensive," see
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (finding scenes in the film Carnal Knowledge,
in which it was understood that sexual acts were taking place, not to be patently offensive or
obscene).
253. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
254. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1933) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80
(2007)). The Georgia statute at issue in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, is a
precursor to the anti-obscenity statute challenged in This That And The Other Gift And
Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga., 285 F.3d 1319 (11 th Cir. 2002). See supra notes 143-44
and accompanying text.
255. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69-70.
256. See Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 299, 301
(2008) (characterizing obscenity law post-Lawrence as an anomaly, at best).
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between consenting adults can no longer be criminalized, how can
descriptions or depictions of such activity be criminalized?" 257
II. THE DEBATE: THE COURTS DIVIDE OVER How AND WHETHER THE
JUDICIARY SHOULD UPHOLD STATE BANS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
SEXUAL DEVICES
Part II focuses on the circuit split surrounding the issue of whether
statutes banning the sale of sexual devices may be invalidated by invoking a
fundamental right to sexual privacy. Part II.A examines the conflicting
post-Lawrence decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and considers
the scholarly analysis advocating judicial conservatism in upholding state
sexual device bans. Part II.B discusses a number of state court challenges
and examines how those decisions invalidated anti-sexual device statutes
before Lawrence.
A. Rationally Related: Upholding Anti-Sexual Device Legislation
1. Judicial Decisions Upholding State Bans on the Distribution of Sexual
Devices
Immediately after the enactment of the 1998 Alabama Anti-Obscenity
Enforcement Act, Sherri Williams, the owner of the store Pleasures with
locations in Huntsville and Decatur, Alabama, filed suit to enjoin the
statute's enforcement. 258 The ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of the
user and vendor plaintiffs, and argued that the statute violated a
fundamental right to sexual intimacy because it impermissibly burdened
one's ability to use sexual devices.259 For the next nine years, Williams's
claim would be considered by the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama in a series of six decisions,
referred to collectively as Williams v. Attorney General. The district court
distinguished Williams from Lawrence and held that the statute survived
rational basis scrutiny. 260 The Eleventh Circuit, in Williams v. Morgan
(" Williams V!"), 261 found that public morality remained a legitimate
rational basis justification after Lawrence, and hence upheld the
constitutionality of the Alabama statute.262
257. See id. at301.
258. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2005) (amended 1998); Alabama May Soon Be
Alone on Sex Toy Sales Ban, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (Ala.), Feb. 21, 2008, at 2B. See generally
Holt, supra note 162, at 928-29.
259. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (1 lth Cir. 2004);
see also Theiss, supra note 15, at 481-82. The user plaintiffs included women who used
sexual devices therapeutically, and the vendor plaintiffs included both store owners and
individuals who sold sexual devices at home parties. Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F.
Supp. 2d 1257, 1265-67 (N.D. Ala. 2002); see also Theiss, supra note 15, at 482.
260. Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257,1282-84 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
261. 478 F.3d 1316 (llth Cir. 2007).
262. Id.
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In Williams IV,263 the court addressed the issue of whether the challenged
statute infringed upon some fundamental right as guaranteed by the
Constitution.2 64  Citing Glucksberg, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
although the Supreme Court has enumerated a number of rights touching on
privacy and personal autonomy as fundamental, this does not mean that any
liberty sounding in personal autonomy may be afforded constitutional
protection. 265 In considering the ACLU's due process claim, the court held
that, although "[t]he [Supreme] Court has been presented with repeated
opportunities to identify a fundamental right to sexual privacy," it has
consistently failed to do SO. 2 6 6 The Eleventh Circuit then focused on the
Court's "most recent opportunity to recognize a fundamental right to sexual
privacy," Lawrence v. Texas, and declined to read Lawrence as announcing
a new fundamental right because the Court did not engage in the traditional
Glucksberg analysis used to identify new fundamental rights.267
Williams IV was subsequently remanded to the district court for further
proceedings, which then returned to the Eleventh Circuit on appeal in
Williams VT The issue in Williams VI was whether public morality
remained a legitimate rational basis for challenging a statute after
Lawrence.268 The court distinguished the private sexual conduct targeted
by the Texas statute in Lawrence from the public, commercial statute at
issue in Williams, maintaining that "[t]o the extent Lawrence rejects public
morality as a legitimate government interest, it invalidates only those laws
that target conduct that is both private and non-commercial. '269 The
Eleventh Circuit continued its analysis stating that, although public morality
was insufficient to sustain the Texas statute involving private sexual
behavior, promoting public morality remains a sufficient rational basis for
sustaining statutes regulating private, commercial activity. 270 Additionally,
the Williams VI court refused to read Lawrence as rendering public morality
"altogether illegitimate as a rational basis," 271 instead upholding the
263. 378 F.3d 1232.
264. See id. at 1234; Elimelekh, supra note 8, at 265 (summarizing Williams IV).
265. Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1235 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727
(1997)).
266. Id. at 1235-36 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5
(1977)).
267. Id. at 1237. Traditional substantive due process analysis, as reaffirmed in
Washington v. Glucksberg, has two main features: (a) the Due Process Clause protects those
rights and liberties that are deeply rooted in the history and traditions of Americans and
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed,"' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)); and (b) the fundamental liberty interest must be carefully
described and the infringement must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest, id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
268. Williams v. Morgan (Williams V), 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
269. Id. at 1322; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
270. Williams VI, 478 F.3d at 1322-23.
271. Id. at 1323.
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previously articulated notion that "[t]he law . . . is constantly based on
notions of morality. '272
The Eleventh Circuit's ultimate decision in Williams VI was not well
received by Alabamians, who criticized the court's holding as "backwards"
and "embarrassing." 273  The Birmingham News described Alabama
Attorney General Troy King's quixotic quest to uphold the statute as
"bizarre and costly," and noted State Representative John Rogers's
discontent with "Alabama's embarrassing habit of bending backward to be
backward. ' 274 The article further criticized the legislature's misplaced
priorities-choosing to amend the state's anti-obscenity law to include a
ban on sexual devices instead of resolving issues of education, poverty,
immigration, and drugs. 275 Interestingly, in an editorial seemingly opposed
to the use of sexual devices, Huntsville resident Samuel L. Smith, Sr.,
adopted the libertarian view that one's own moral compass, not the law,
should govern in matters of sexual privacy.276
The rationale set forth by the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in the Williams
cases was reiterated and refined in a dissenting opinion by Judge Emilion
Garza of the Fifth Circuit. 277 Following the February 12, 2008, decision of
the Fifth Circuit in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, the State of Texas
petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc.278 The rehearing was
denied; however, Judge Garza, in his dissenting opinion, offered a
comprehensive rebuttal to the Reliable Consultants, Inc. majority's prior
decision. 279 To Judge Garza, the Reliable Consultants, Inc. court made two
fatal errors: (1) it misunderstood the right articulated in Lawrence, and (2)
it extended the liberty interest asserted in Lawrence far beyond its limits.280
According to Garza, the Court in Lawrence failed to announce a
fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny analysis, but rather recognized
only a narrow privacy interest protecting "two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engage[] in sexual practices" within their
homes. 281  Although the level of scrutiny employed in Lawrence is
indeterminate at best, Garza avowedly claims that the Court applied rational
basis analysis, hence implying that a fundamental right was not
recognized. 282 By declining to assign a level of scrutiny, the Reliable
272. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
273. See John Archibald, Rogers Out to Bust Sex Toy Ban, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.),
Jan. 20, 2008, at 15A.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Samuel L. Smith, Sr., Letter to the Editor, Out of the Rain, HUNTSVILLE TIMES
(Ala.), Apr. 13, 2008, at 22A.
277. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 538 F.3d
355 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., dissenting).
278. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 538 F.3d at 358.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Consultants, Inc. court instead took its analysis outside the realm of
traditional substantive due process jurisprudence and opened its assessment
to significant errors.283 The Reliable majority erred by recasting the right
announced in Lawrence as a sweeping privacy interest encompassing a
commercial right to promote sexual devices; this, maintained Judge Garza,
is inconsistent with the very narrow privacy interest actually articulated in
Lawrence.284 In other words, the Fifth Circuit "improperly broadened the
scope of this narrow personal liberty interest to encompass commercial
activity, '285 and in the process they created a circuit split.286
In the March 2004 decision of PHE, Inc. v. Mississippi, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi affirmed a Chancery Court ruling upholding the
constitutionality of section 97-29-105 of the Mississippi Code. 287 Section
97-29-105 provided that "knowingly selling, advertising, publishing or
exhibiting any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful
primarily for the stimulation of human genitalia ('sexual devices') is
illegal. '288 Vendors and users of sexual devices brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that Mississippi's sexual device statute violated the
state's constitution. 289 Plaintiffs included "vendor plaintiff' PHE, Inc., a
corporation that did business as Adam & Eve, known to use the U.S. Postal
Service to advertise and sell its products, and "user plaintiffs" who were
Mississippi residents who wished to buy sexual devices. 290 The vendor
plaintiffs argued that the state statute unduly burdened their rights to
advertise their products, and the user plaintiffs maintained that the state
violated their right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
their private sexual practices. 291 The state moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that (1) limiting the distribution of sexual devices did not
violate any constitutional right, and (2) restricting advertisements regarding
sexual devices was consistent with the contours of regulated commercial
speech. 292
Judge William L. Waller, writing on behalf of the court, found that there
is no "'independent fundamental right of access to purchase [sexual
devices],' just as the United States Supreme Court found that there was no
independent fundamental right of access to purchase contraceptives." 293
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 360.
286. Id. at 361.
287. PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2004); see Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105
(West 1999) (forbidding the sale, advertisement, publication, or exhibition of any device
meant to stimulate the genitals).
288. PHE, Inc., 877 So. 2d at 1246 (citing MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105); see supra
notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
289. PHE, Inc., 877 So. 2d at 1246.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1247.




The Mississippi Supreme Court stated its disagreement with other courts'
analogous treatment of contraceptives and sexual devices.294 The court
held that society's interest in protecting the right to control conception is of
greater magnitude than the interest in protecting the right to purchase sexual
devices. 295 Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court maintained that
those who suffer from sexual dysfunction should be treated by a physician
or psychologist who may prescribe sexual devices;2 96 these devices, the
court asserted, are distinct from the "novelty and gag gifts" sold by the
vendor plaintiffs. 297
The court next addressed whether section 97-29-105's prohibition on
advertising, sale, and distribution of sexual devices violates the vendor
plaintiffs' constitutional right to free speech. 298 Judge Waller found that
sexual devices are, at best, symbolic speech, and therefore subject to the test
set forth in United States v. O'Brien.299 The O'Brien content-neutral test
permits the regulation of symbolic speech if, by proscribing the conduct, the
government is furthering a substantial government interest, if the
government's interest is unrelated to suppressing free speech, and provided
that the restriction is no greater than that necessary to advance the state
interest.300 Because plaintiffs did not raise allegations questioning any of
the O'Brien factors, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the O'Brien test
and found that sexual devices were not within the ambit of symbolic
speech, and therefore not constitutionally protected.30 1
2. Defending Anti-vibrator Legislation After Lawrence
Following the 2003 decision Lawrence v. Texas there has been limited
scholarship declining to extend the privacy interest created in Lawrence
beyond the act of homosexual sodomy. The two most notable analyses
maintain that (1) after Lawrence, the regulation of morality remains a
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 1248-49.
297. Id. at 1249.
298. Id. at 1249-50.
299. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
300. PHE, Inc., 877 So. 2d at 1249 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367). In United States v.
O'Brien, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a statutory regulation of conduct that embodied
both speech and nonspeech elements was "sufficiently justified iff: (a)] it further[ed] an
important or substantial governmental interest; [(b)] if the governmental interest [was]
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(c)] if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms [was] no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance
of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377.
301. See PHE, Inc., 877 So. 2d at 1249.
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legitimate state interest 302 and (2) that substantive due process should be
replaced by the political question doctrine.30 3
Proponents of the first view hold that, in overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Lawrence Court merely broadened the boundary of privacy to include
private, consensual, homosexual conduct, and did not recognize a
fundamental right to privacy in homosexual conduct. 304 To arrive at this
conclusion, one must reject Justice Scalia's tacit admission that Lawrence
represented the abandonment of morality as a legitimate state interest,305
and instead accept that morality remains a viable interest outside the limited
right recognized in Lawrence.30 6
The second argument declining to overrule sexual device legislation
acknowledges that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to sexual
privacy whose boundaries have not yet been explored, and holds that these
questions of privacy are best addressed by state legislatures. 30 7 In applying
substantive due process, privacy opinions presume that judges have "the
ability and duty to determine those personal choices that define human life
and sustain personal dignity," and can do so more effectively than
democratically elected representatives. 30 8 By dictating a uniform, one-size-
fits-all definition of personal dignity and autonomy in terms of sexual
activity, the Court has crafted a doctrine inconsistent with protecting
personal property rights, such as that implicated by surveillance technology,
the Internet, and media communications. 30 9 Consequently, one's overall
privacy, sexual and otherwise, is best protected by a democratic system that
puts the issue in a broader perspective, and encompasses broader individual
interests.310
B. Cases Invalidating Statutes Prohibiting the Sale of Sexual Devices
Seeking to capitalize on the presumed market of Texans using or seeking
to use sexual devices as an aspect of their sexual experiences, Reliable
Consultants, Inc., doing business as Dreamer's and Le Rouge Boutique,
sought declaratory action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
302. Douglas E. Nauman, Note, Where Sexual Privacy Meets Public Morality: How
Williams v. King Is Instructive for the Fourth Circuit in Applying Morality as a Legitimate
State Interest After Lawrence v. Texas, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 145 (2006).
303. Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political
Question Doctrine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169,
170, 186 (2006).
304. See Nauman, supra note 302, at 143.
305. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Nauman,
supra note 302, at 143-45.
306. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1247-48 (N.D. Ala. 2006);
Nauman, supra note 302, at 145 (maintaining that Williams V is distinguished from
Lawrence because the issue in Williams was not encapsulated in the limited right to engage
in homosexual sodomy as defined in Lawrence).
307. See Garry, supra note 303, at 186.
308. Id. at 187.
309. Id. at 187-88.
310. Id. at 189-90.
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of Texas to enjoin the enforcement of the statutory measures prohibiting the
sale of sexual devices. 311 The plaintiffs claim, predicated on the existence
of a due process right to sexual autonomy, required the court to consider
whether Lawrence had announced a fundamental right to sexual privacy
sufficiently broad to render the Texas statute "impermissibly burdens[ome
on] the individual's substantive due process right to engage in private
intimate conduct of his or her choosing. ' 312 Analyzing the language in
Lawrence, Judge Thomas Morrow Reavley of the Fifth Circuit, writing for
the majority, found that in answering its stated question in the affirmative-
"'[whether] petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual
intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ''3 13
Lawrence recognized a right to be free from government interference
regarding private sexual behavior. 314  Acknowledging the Lawrence
Court's failure to state the applicable level of scrutiny, Judge Reavley
explained that, as an inferior federal court, the court of appeals need only
apply Lawrence to the Texas statute, not address the question of scrutiny.315
The Fifth Circuit further held that justifying a statute as solely morally
based can no longer satisfy rational relationship scrutiny after Lawrence.316
Perhaps recognizing that public morality was an insufficient justification for
the statute, the state asserted additional interests in protecting children from
"improper sexual expression" and "protecting 'unwilling adults' from
exposure"; 317 to this end, the court found no rational relationship between
the statute and these interests. 318 Although urged by plaintiffs, the Fifth
Circuit declined to explore the commercial speech claim "because if it is
necessary, it may be premature. '319
Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, dissenting and concurring from the
Reliable Consultants, Inc. majority, distinguished the private use of sexual
aids in the home from the devices' commercial promotion. 320 Like Judge
311. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2008).
312. Id. at 744; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 564 (2003).
313. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).
314. Id.
315. See id. at 744-45.
316. Compare id. at 745 with supra note 272 and accompanying text (illuminating the
circuit split between the fifth and eleventh Circuits regarding whether it is permissible to
legislate morality after Lawrence).
317. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 746.
318. Id. at 746.
319. Id. at 747. Although not considered by the court in Reliable Consultants, Inc., the
extent to which government may regulate commercial speech is evaluated under the holding
in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of N. Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980). Under Central Hudson, for a regulation on speech to be constitutional, the
speech in question must (a) be protected by the First Amendment, i.e., concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; (b) the asserted governmental interest must be substantial; (c)
and the regulation must "directly advanc[e]" the governmental interest and "not [be] more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id.
320. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 748 (Barksdale, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
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Emilio M. Garza in his dissent from the motion for rehearing en banc,
Judge Barksdale believed that the majority's failure to assign a level of
scrutiny to the newly promulgated right was fatal, and that rational basis
scrutiny should have been properly applied.321 Furthermore, she subscribed
to the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation in Williams VI that Lawrence's
rejection of morality as a legitimate public interest only applies to those acts
which are "both private and non-commercial.' '322
Although the privacy interest acknowledged in Lawrence, however it is
defined, will likely be the dominant interpretive doctrine employed by
courts confronting sexual autonomy, state court cases invalidating sexual
device legislation prior to the watershed 2003 decision may be instructive in
crafting sound challenges to anti-obscenity statutes.
In the pre-Lawrence decision Louisiana v. Brennan,323 the Louisiana
State Supreme Court struck down a statutory provision banning the
promotion of sexual devices in order to promote morality and public order,
holding that the statutory prohibition did not bear a rational relationship to
that interest, and was therefore unconstitutional. 324
Defendant Christine Brennan was arrested on three occasions for selling
sexual devices at her dance wear boutique. 325 The devices, both those
explicitly marketed for sexual use and those promoted as muscle massagers,
were located in a section of the boutique separated by latticework and
labeled "For adults only." 326  Undercover police agents purchased Ms.
Brennan's wares and seized the rest upon the defendant's arrest. 327
Brennan pleaded not guilty to the charges and filed a motion to quash on
state constitutional grounds.328 Defense counsel alleged that the statute
"'violate[d] the privacy rights of the defendant and her customers under
Griswold v. Connecticut, and its progeny, and privacy rights as guaranteed
by Article 1, [section] 5, of the Louisiana Constitution.' ' 329 The state
maintained that Louisiana Revised Statute section 14:106.1 promoted a
legitimate government interest, the protection of minors and nonconsenting
adults from exposure to obscene materials, and that a ban on all sexual
devices was a rational means to achieve that interest. 330
Judge Bernette Johnson, writing for the majority, declined to "extend
constitutional protection in the way of privacy to the promotion of sexual
321. Id. at 749.
322. Id. (quoting Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (1 1th Cir.
2007)).
323. 772 So.2d 64 (La. 2000).
324. Id. at 64.
325. Id. at 65.
326. Id. at 66.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. (quoting State v. Brennan, 1998-2368 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/1/99); 739 So. 2d 368,
369).
330. Id. at 67-68.
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devices," 331 and instead applied rational basis scrutiny to ensure that a
legitimate governmental interest supported the legislation, and that the
resulting law bore a rational relation to that interest.332 After reviewing the
legislative history of the statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the
statute's primary purpose was not to protect minors and nonconsenting
adults from viewing obscene materials as assumed, but rather was part of
the general war on obscenity of the mid-1980s. 333
The court held that Louisiana's unqualified ban on sexual devices
ignored the fact that the use of vibrators may be therapeutically appropriate
in some cases. 334 Given these therapeutic uses, the court concluded that the
state's actions banning all devices that were designed or marketed primarily
for genital stimulation without any review of their prurience or medical use
were not rationally related to the "'war on obscenity.' ' 335
In another pre-Lawrence decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas found
that section 21-4301 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, a statute prohibiting
the dissemination of obscene devices was overbroad and ignored the
therapeutic use of such devices for medical and psychological disorders. 336
In Kansas v. Hughes,337 the court's decision to invalidate the statute was
based largely on the testimony of Dr. Douglas Mould, a certified
psychologist and sex therapist called by the defense in an evidentiary
hearing. 338 According to Dr. Mould's testimony, anorgasmic women may
be particularly susceptible to pelvic inflammatory diseases, psychological
problems, and marital difficulties; it is common for sexual devices to be
recommended to treat anorgasmic women. 339 Additionally, women with
weak pelvic muscles suffer from a higher incidence of urinary stress
incontinence. 340 To strengthen these muscles, incontinent women are often
prescribed Kegel exercises with a dildo or dildo-type vibrator to provide
resistance.341 Dr. Mould testified that he often directed his patients to adult
bookstores to find sexual devices suitable for their therapy; he maintained
that the unavailability of sexual devices through retail outlets would
substantially impact the effective treatment of anorgasmic women. 342 The
331. Id. at 72.
332. Id. at 72-76.
333. Id. at 72-73. Minutes from the 1985 Senate Committee on Judiciary Section C
considering the bill reveal that the bill's supporters were highly concerned with waging a
war on obscenity. Id. at 73 (citation omitted). The law was passed during the
antipornography crusade of the mid-1980s after the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography drew alleged links between pornography and violence; sexual devices were not
the object of that study. Id.
334. Id. at 75; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
335. Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 75-76.
336. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1031-32 (Kan. 1990).
337. 792 P.2d 1023.
338. Id. at 1025.
339. Id.; see supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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state maintained that a device could be obscene even if the motivation for
using the device is not obscene (i.e., medical, therapeutic, and
psychological uses).343
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Kansas found section 21-
4301 overbroad because it did not restrict its scope to distribution of
devices for obscene purposes, noting the legislature cannot make a device
automatically obscene merely through the use of labels.344 The term
"sexually provocative aspect" in section 2 of the statute, "impermissibly
equates sexuality with obscenity." "The legislature may not declare a
device obscene simply because it relates to human sexuality." 345
Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration has issued regulations
regarding "powered vaginal muscle stimulators" and "genital vibrators" for
the treatment of sexual dysfunction and the use of Kegel exercises in
conjunction with such devices; these regulations are a tacit recognition of
the legitimate need for the availability of sexual aids.346
In a case similar to Hughes, the Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting en
banc, struck down Colorado's anti-sexual device statute. 347 The court in
People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc. found the
substantive due process privacy interest developed through the
contraceptive and abortion cases sufficiently broad to protect the
therapeutic use of sexual devices. 348 Although the court did not consider
whether the Colorado statute properly labeled sexual devices as obscene, it
maintained that any legislation describing sexual aids as patently obscene
"must be compatible with the right of a person to engage in sexual activities
to the extent that right is encompassed within the constitutional right of
privacy." 349  Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court of Colorado
invalidated the statute, holding that the state interest was not "sufficiently
compelling to justify the infringement on the privacy right of those seeking
to use them in legitimate ways." 350
Feminist commentator Danielle Lindeman criticizes the therapeutic
rationale offered by Courts in pre-Lawrence decisions, arguing that
pathologizing the female orgasm for the sake of overturning an
unconstitutional statute is in itself unjust. Because all of this country's
sexual device regulation has been part of anti-obscenity statutes, the
challenger must prove that the material in question has specific nonprurient
343. Id. at 1026; cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (2006).
344. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) ("[A]
State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels.").
345. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1957)
("[Slex and obscenity are not synonymous.").
346. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1031.
347. People ex reL Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo.
1985).
348. Id. at 369-70.
349. Id. at 370 n.28.
350. Id. at 370.
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value; 351 this has led to the continued espousal of therapeutic arguments. 352
By advancing medical arguments when there was no burden to prove the
medical efficacy of the devices, the challengers implied that "female sexual
gratification, in and of itself, was not a valid objective." 353 "The legally-
validated insinuation that the vibrator cannot be legitimated by its ability to
provide female orgasms is a blow to women's sexual rights in this
country." 354 However, a number of sexual aides designed predominantly
for men, such as Playboy and Viagra, are not regulated by the same codes
that regulate sexual devices. 355 Lindeman argues that, because the majority
of individuals who use insertable sexual aides are women, making them
either contraband or restricting them to therapeutic usage is "another
institutionalized form of controlling female sexuality. '356
III. BEYOND LAWRENCE: CRAFTING A RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY THAT
ENCOMPASSES THE SALE AND USE OF SEXUAL DEVICES
Crafting a doctrine of sexual privacy broad enough to encompass the
liberty to sell, promote, distribute, and use sexual devices must go beyond
the Court's problematic decision in Lawrence. The decision's sweeping
language, discussing the "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex," 357 and seeming rejection of solely morals-based
legislation, is obfuscated by the majority's failure to employ modem
substantive due process analysis. 358
The Supreme Court, however, should clarify its decision in Lawrence
and substantiate the right to sexual privacy that many have interpreted
Lawrence to establish. Justice Kennedy affirmatively states that the
language in Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers should be controlling in
Lawrence.359 The majority's clear adoption of the premises that (1) "the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law" and (2) individual
351. See Lindemann, supra note 62, at 343; supra note 86 and accompanying text.
352. Lindemann, supra note 62, at 343,
353. Id. at 344.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. (quoting Taormino, supra note 91).
357. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
358. See Barnett, supra note 207, at 1493-94; Glazer, supra note 212, at 1413. There is
some discussion in Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1252-53 (N.D.
Ala. 2006), that Justice Kennedy's analysis in Lawrence is a form of rational basis review
contemplated in Carolene Products footnote 4, however to suggest that the majority in
Lawrence would employ obscure doctrine to mask the fact that it was not announcing a
fundamental right to sexual privacy is absurd. In Williams V, Judge C. Lynwood Smith, Jr.,
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, posited that the concern of
paragraph three of Carolene Products footnote 4-that democratic processes may break
down and systematically prejudice unfavorable minorities-is precisely the matter addressed
by the Lawrence majority. Id. at 1252 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980)).
359. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
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decisions of married or unmarried persons "concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring,
are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, '360 confirms the Court's intention to prescribe the
bounds of personal liberty to include the right to be free from governmental
intervention in one's intimate relationships. At its narrowest, the liberty
interest established in Lawrence offers additional constitutional protection
for acts of homosexual sodomy; however, it is unlikely that the Court would
have granted certiorari to resolve so narrow an issue, especially one
considered by the Court only seventeen years before. 361  The most
texturally and doctrinally sound interpretation of Lawrence guarantees
Fourteenth Amendment protection for the intimate decisions to engage in
any type of adult consensual sexual behavior. 362 Hence, after Lawrence,
questions of sexual privacy, including the liberty to sell, purchase, and use a
sexual device should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.
Although strict scrutiny is the proper standard for assessing anti-sexual
device legislation, these statutes do not bear a rational relationship to the
stated government aims. By adopting Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers,
Justice Kennedy asserts in Lawrence that morality alone is not a legitimate
state interest for the purposes of due process analysis.363 Although Justice
Scalia's declaration that Lawrence effectively spells the end of all morals-
based legislation may be grounded in hyperbole, his reaction clearly
contradicts the notion promulgated in Williams VI-that Lawrence rejects
public morality as a legitimate state end only if the challenged statute
targets conduct that is both private and noncommercial. 364 Hence, the
primacy of morality reflected in the legislative record of the surviving anti-
sexual device statutes indicates that they should not survive rational review
under the newly articulated Lawrence standard.
Should the Court adopt the interpretation put forth in Williams VI (which
it should not), 365 anti-sexual device laws will become more likely to
survive rational review. Under Glucksberg, the substantive reach of the
Due Process Clause must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
360. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
361. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
362. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. The holding in Lawrence does not address the status
of state "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity"; this is undoubtedly a factor in Lawrence that has been
construed narrowly by some courts. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is essential for the
Court to differentiate between those acts that are inherently repugnant from those that have
recently fallen into disfavor. See also supra note 313 and accompanying text.
363. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
364. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 268-72 and accompanying
text. Justice Antonin Scalia's comment is more than a tacit admission that Lawrence was
meant to profoundly affect the state of morality-based legislation.
365. See supra notes 268-72.
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tradition"366 and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '367 Although
there is no long-standing history of government regulation of the sale,
distribution, or use of sexual devices, it would be disingenuous to argue that
the use of sexual devices is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition"368 especially when the physiological effects of sexual devices
were misunderstood for a significant part of their history. 369 Although the
absence of antisodomy legislation until the 1970s mirrors the historical
trajectory of anti-sexual device legislation, the Lawrence Court's failure to
subject the Texas statute to rational review casts doubt on whether the
historical argument would have had much weight under the Glucksberg
two-step.370
The court in Williams VI and the dissenting voices in Reliable
Consultants, Inc. I and 11 express concern that acknowledging a
fundamental right to distribute, manufacture, sell, promote, etc. sexual
devices "improperly broaden[s] the scope of th[e] narrow personal liberty
interest [recognized in Lawrence] to encompass commercial activity."371
This contention, however, is refuted by long-standing Supreme Court
jurisprudence holding that businesses may "assert the rights of their
customers and that restricting the ability to purchase an item is tantamount
to restricting that item's use." 372 Hence, the vendor plaintiffs have standing
to assert the use access and use rights of their customers.
Additionally, just as the Court in Lawrence recognized the "emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex," 373
any discussion of the fundamental right to distribute, manufacture, sell,
promote, etc. sexual devices must address the statistical prevalence and
social visibility of sexual devices. 374 The Berman Center's 2004 study, The
Health Benefits of Sexual Aids & Devices: A Comprehensive Study of Their
Relationship to Satisfaction and Quality of Life, found that forty-four
percent of women had used a sexual device in their lifetime, and that,
overall, women viewed vibrators as a beneficial part of a healthy sex life. 375
The prevalence of luxury boudoir boutiques, 376 the sale of "personal
366. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
367. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1907)).
368. Id. (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568; see supra Part
I.A.2.
369. See supra Part I.A.2.
370. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568; see supra Part I.A.2.
371. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 538 F.3d
355, 360 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 743; see, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 683-91 (1977).
373. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
374. See supra Part I.A.2.a-b.
375. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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massagers" at mass market retailers, 377 the popularity of Passion Parties, 378
and the open discourse on daytime television programming 379 further
evidences America's acceptance of sexual device use as an important part
of female sexual fulfillment. The fact that nearly half of American women
of reproductive age have used a sexual device, 380 coupled with the visibility
and accessibility of retail outlets carrying such items, 381 suggests a
consensus-more than the mere "emerging awareness" relied upon in
Lawrence-that there exists a liberty interest in distributing, manufacturing,
selling, and promoting sexual devices.
CONCLUSION
This Note posits that the problematic decision in Lawrence v. Texas must
be interpreted broadly to guarantee Fourteenth Amendment protection for
the intimate decisions to engage in adult consensual sexual behavior and
encompass a fundamental right to sexual privacy. The late twentieth
century emergence of statutes restricting the sale, distribution, manufacture,
and promotion of sexual devices unduly infringes on an individual's sexual
autonomy and cannot survive after Lawrence. The Lawrence Court's
adoption of Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, stating that
individual decisions regarding sexual intimacy are a protected form of
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, guaranteed Fourteenth
Amendment protection for intimate decisions to engage in any type of adult
consensual sexual behavior. Additionally, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Lawrence implicitly recognized that the Court's decision essentially
invalidated morality as a legitimate state interest for the purpose of rational
review. This interpretation of Lawrence, when considered in the historical,
social, and statistical context underlying the current circuit split regarding
sexual device regulation, is sufficient to both invalidate anti-sexual device
legislation and recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy.
377. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
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